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ABSTRACT
The widespread adoption of mobile devices gives rise to new opportunities and
challenges for authentication mechanisms. Many traditional authentication mechanisms
become unsuitable for smart devices. For example, while password is widely used on
computers as user identity authentication, inputting password on small smartphone screen
is error-prone and not convenient. In the meantime, there are emerging demands for new
types of authentication. Proximity authentication is an example, which is not needed for
computers but quite necessary for smart devices. These challenges motivate me to study
and develop novel authentication mechanisms specific for smart devices.
In this dissertation, I am interested in the special authentication demands of smart
devices and about to satisfy the demands. First, I study how the features of smart devices
affect user identity authentications. For identity authentication domain, I aim to design a
continuous, forge-resistant authentication mechanism that does not interrupt user-device
interactions. I propose a mechanism that authenticates user identity based on the user’s
finger movement patterns. Next, I study a smart-device-specific authentication, proximity
authentication, which authenticates whether two devices are in close proximity. For prox-
imity authentication domain, I aim to design a user-friendly authentication mechanism that
can defend against relay attacks. In addition, I restrict the authenticated distance to the scale
of near field, i.e., a few centimeters. My first design utilizes a user’s coherent two-finger
movement on smart device screen to restrict the distance. To achieve a fully-automated
system, I explore acoustic communications and propose a novel near field authentication
system.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Authentication is to verify a claim. Identity authentication verifies the claim that a given
user is the owner of a given identity. Proximity authentication verifies the claim that two
given devices are in close proximity. Authentication is a fundamentally important security
mechanism that provides a security base for many security applications. In other words,
many security applications grant user services or privileges based on the authentication
result. For example, identity authentication helps applications to recognize users so as
to provide personalized services. The authentication is thus the very first step to the ser-
vice. Many other applications even reject to provide services when the authentication fails.
Smartphones are personal devices and unlocking a smartphone requires authenticating a
user’s identity. If the user is not one of the expected users, the smartphone would not
allow the user to get into the system. Therefore, authentication is an important security
mechanism.
The emerging usage of smart devices leads to the demands for new authentication
types. Proximity authentication is a new authentication type that is closely associated with
smart devices. Due to the mobility of the devices, physical proximity becomes a measure
of trust between two smart devices. Proximity authentication is to ensure this trust before
a security application takes place. For example, fast near field file transmission application
1
[3] transmits files between two smart devices only when they are in the near field. Authen-
ticating the physical proximity of the two devices is therefore essential to the success of
such applications.
1.1 Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange
In many cases, security applications want authentication not only to verify the claim
but also to output an integer number. The integer number is then used as a session key to
protect the follow-up conversations in the application. Therefore, we require the integer
number to be as random as possible, i.e., a random integer of high entropy. Password-
based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) is such an authentication protocol that generates
a high-entropy random integer from the same low-entropy password shared between two
parties involved in the authentication. The phrase “low entropy” means the password is
chosen from a small set of possible values. This small set is called dictionary. We will use
PAKE many times in the following chapters of this dissertation.
In the model of PAKE, two involved parties share a short, low-entropy password and
they want to agree on a high-entropy random integer that can be used as a cryptographic
key. They want to achieve this in the presence of a powerful and malicious attacker, who
fully controls the communication channels and can perform any attack. Since a password
is of low entropy, the brute force method that tries all the possible values in the dictionary
succeeds after a small number of attempts during the authentication. This attack is called
on-line dictionary attack and is inevitable. However, to limit its damage, we can adopt
a policy that a password is invalidated or blocked if a certain number of failed attempts
have occurred. Therefore, one of PAKE’s security goals is to ensure that online-dictionary
attacks can be detected. In another attack, an attacker makes active or passive attacks during
an authentication, and then performs brute-force attacks on the password dictionary in a off-
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line way, i.e., no communications with the two parties involved in the authentication. This
attack is called off-line attack and should be fully prevented by a PAKE protocol. PAKE
is generally divided into two types, two-party PAKE and group PAKE. We are about to
mainly use and discuss two-party PAKE in this dissertation.
Bellovin and Merrit [15] proposed the first PAKE scheme, the so-called Encrypted
KEy Exchange (EKE). Their scheme is based on an ideal cipher, which is supposed to be a
random permutation over a plaintext block for each given key. An attacker cannot infer any
information about the output by encrypting any other block or the same block under any
other key. The ideal cipher model is a heuristic rather than a plausibly true case in practise.
Many extensions and analyses [5, 14, 20, 21] have been proposed to reduce the needs for
ideal cipher but none of these works eliminated the ideal cipher from the protocol.
Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung [56] proposed the first practical scheme that does not
need an ideal cipher, i.e., works in standard model. The scheme assumes a common ref-
erence string from which each party can retrieve needed random strings. The common
reference string model is plausible in a practical sense because a implementation can hard
code all the needed strings in the program. The protocol takes place between a client and a
server, and is described below.
• Initialization: provided a security parameter k, the protocol selects three other pa-
rameters: 1) a multiplicative group G of prime order q where q is of k bits, 2) ran-
dom generators g1, g2, h, c, d ∈ G¯, where G¯ def= G\{1}, and 3) a hash function
H : {0,1}∗→ Zq chosen at random from a collision-resistant hash family.
• The client generates a key pair (V K,SK) for signature, where V K and SK are re-
spectively verification key and signing key. Picking a random integer r1← Zq, the
client calculates A = gr11 , B = g
r1
2 , and C = h
r1 · pwc, where pwc is the client’s pass-
3
word. Next, the client combines all the necessary information together by using
hash function: α = H(PID|V K|A|B|C), where PID is a string that uniquely identi-
fies this execution. The original protocol proposed to use the concatenation of the
client’s name and the server’s name as PID. After obtaining α , the clients calculates
D = (cdα)r1 . Finally, the client sends message Client|V K|A|B|C|D to the sever. This
message is denoted by msg1.
• The server selects five random integers x2, y2, z2, w2, r2 ← Zq. Combining his
version of the client’s information together: α ′ = H(PID|V K|A|B|C), the server cal-
culates E = gx21 g
y2
2 h
z2(cdα
′
)w2 , F = gr21 , G= g
r2
2 , and I = h
r2 · pws. The server receives
the aforementioned message, msg1. The server combines the message with his own
information together: β = H(msg1|Server|E|F |G|I), and calculates J = (cdβ )r2 . Fi-
nally, the server sends message Server|E|F |G|I|J to the client and this message is
denoted by msg2.
• The client selects four random integers x1, y1, z1, w1 ← Zq, and calculates β ′ =
H(msg1|Server|E|F |G|I) and K = gx11 gy12 hz1(cdβ
′
)w1 . The client signs all the trans-
mitted messages Sig← SignSK(msg1|msg2|K) and sends K|Sig to the server.
• The server verifies the signature using VrfyV K(msg1|msg2|K,Sig). If it is not true,
the server aborts the protocol. Otherwise, the server calculates C′ = C/pws and
obtains his session key sks = Ax2By2(C′)z2Dw2Kr2 .
• The clients calculates I′= I/pwc and obtains his session key skc =Fx1Gy1(I′)z1Jw1Er1 .
First of all, the two resulting session keys are identical if the client and the server
have the same password, pws = pwc. The correctness can be verified by the following
4
equations
Er1 = (gx21 g
y2
2 h
z2(cdα)w2)r1
= (gr11 )
x2(gr12 )
y2(hr1)z2((cdα)r1)w2
= Ax2By2(C′)z2Dw2
and
Kr2 = (gx11 g
y1
2 h
z1(cdβ
′
)w1)r2
= (gr21 )
x1(gr22 )
y1(hr2)z1((cdβ )r2)w1
= Fx1Gy1(I′)z1Jw1.
Therefore:
skc = Er1(Fx1Gy1(I′)z1Jw1) = (Ax2By2(C′)z2Dw2)Kr2 = sks.
Here, we assume that α = α ′, β = β ′, and pwc = pws in an if both parties are honest.
The basic idea of protecting passwords from being eavesdropped is not to use
it directly in any communication message. Instead, a ciphertext of the password, i.e.,
A, B, C, D or F, G, I, J, is transmitted over the channel. Even if the attacker is able
to capture the ciphertext, he cannot learn anything about the password. The two parties in-
volved in the protocol do not need to decrypt the ciphertext since they only want to achieve
the same integer. Each member multiplies all the intermediate integers together and cancels
his own password from the multiplication result. Hence, they can obtain the same number
if the two password are identical. The reason why an online-dictionary attack can be pre-
vented is that the result session key skc or sks is generated at random by each execution and
is bounded with the intermediate communication messages. Without replaying the entire
protocol with an honest party, an attacker cannot carry out a brute force attack. After that,
many works [4, 24, 43, 57] have been proposed to achieve security in the UC framework,
to enhance round efficiency, or to depend on new assumptions.
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Many efficient protocols have been proposed. Among these protocols, SPEKE is
an outstanding one that has been standardized [2]. SPEKE was first described by David
Jablon [47]. In its first construction, SPEKE was not secure and Jablon thus proposed a
refined construction in [48]. SPEKE has been proved to be secure in random oracle model
by Philip MacKenzie [70]. SPEKE works as follows.
• The client and the server agree on a randomly selected safe prime p and a cryp-
tographic hash function H. Again, the client and the server hold their individual
password pwc and pws, which are identical if both parties are honest.
• The client and the server respectively construct gc = H(pwc)2 mod p and gs =
H(pws)2 mod p. Here, squaring makes the resulting integer a generator of quadratic
residue subgroup of the multiplicative group of integers modulo p.
• The client selects an integer at random a← Z and sends the server ga mod p.
• The server selects an integer at random b← Z and sends the client gb mod p.
• The client and the server each abort if their received values are not in the range
[2, p−2]. This is to prevent small subgroup confinement attack [66].
• The client computes session key skc = (gb mod p)a mod p.
• The server computes session key sks = (ga mod p)b mod p.
It is obvious that the server and the client arrive at the same session key if they have
the same password. The protocol protects the confidentiality of the password by using one-
way hash function which gives a unique digest for a given password. The digest is supposed
to not leak any information about the password. This assumption is true in random oracle
model.
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1.2 Overiew and Contributions
This dissertation discusses and studies two important authentication problems for
smart devices — user identity authentication and proximity authentication. For identity
authentication, we study the disadvantages of password based user authentications that is
widely used on current smart devices.
We explore the features of smart devices and utilize the features to construct an
identity authentication that overcomes the disadvantages of password based authentica-
tions and is suitable for smart devices. Proximity authentication is a new authentication
technique that emerges with the widespread use of smart devices. Most existing proximity
authentication scheme either requires an extra equipment or cannot restrict the two devices
in a short proximity range. We study this interesting problem and propose two authentica-
tion systems that both overcome the aforementioned disadvantages. We call an authentica-
tion that can restrict the distance within a few centimeters a near field authentication (NFA).
One scheme is to use human finger movement to restrict the physical distance between the
two devices. The other scheme achieves the authentication based on the physical properties
of sound.
1.2.1 User Authentication for Smartphones
For smartphones, the biggest issue of traditional password based authentication is that it
interrupts the user-smartphone interactions. Users have to stop current session to input
the password. The small virtual keyboard on most smartphones makes this process much
more annoying since people often press wrong keys. In this study, we propose a novel user
authentication scheme based on human finger movement patterns. The main contributions
of this study are listed below.
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Contributions:
• We propose and study the unobservable smartphone re-authentication problem. We
design a novel system architecture especially for smartphones to reduce the compu-
tational overhead on smartphones.
• We propose to use the finger movement as a biometric characteristic to authenticate
a user. When users use smartphones, the smartphones sense the users finger move-
ments and interpret the sensed data as different gestures. Since users have to use
gestures to interact with smartphones in most cases, our proposed approach can en-
force re-authentication to every user. In addition, our approach can continuously re-
authenticate the current user without being noticed by the user.
• We propose an efficient biometric-based re-authentication system for smartphones
using the classification method. We design the biometric features for the classifi-
cation algorithm and discuss their performance. We implemented our system on
a Motorola Droid smartphone to demonstrate its efficiency. Extensive experiments
were performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the features and the performance of
our system.
1.2.2 Finger Movement Based NFA
The purpose of this study is to provide the NFA on most off-the-shelf devices. The proposed
NFA system achieves NFA by using human finger movement on the touch screens of two
nearby smart devices. Human input usually contains errors and is of low entropy, which
affects the usability and security of a system. For these issues, we provide efficient solutions
that can execute on the smart devices of limited resources. An outstanding feature of the
proposed system is that it does not need any prior secret information shared between the
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two devices involved in the authentication. For a successful authentication, the system
generates the same high-entropy cryptographic key for both devices. Finally, we build a
prototype on a Motorola Droid smartphone to demonstrate the efficiency of the system.
Contributions:
• We propose to use zigzag on-screen finger movements to perform near field authen-
tication between two smart devices. Compared with the previous motion patterns,
such as bump, shake, etc., finger movements are easier to carry out and provides
better user experience. Another advantage is that finger movements are small and
hard-to-catch motions. The movements are hard to be observed and emulated by a
nearby attacker, which is a possible attack to the bump system [1].
• We design a robust feature so that two extracted feature data sets are similar to each
other. Zigzag finger movements provide many features, such as curvatures, curvature
distance, moving time, etc. We propose to use the time between the starting point
and a peak point as the feature to be extracted in our system. The reason behind this
choice is that people’s finger usually moves slowly, or even a short-time pause, when
it turns at a curve peak point. Although the time is too short to be noticed by human
eyes, it is long enough to be sensed by touch screens. This makes the elapsed time of
two corresponding peak points very similar to each other.
• We propose an efficient system to remove the differences between two extracted fea-
ture data sets and generate a high-entropy cryptographic key. We design an efficient
approach using a private set intersection protocol to reconciliate the two feature data
sets. As pointed out previously, the feature data is of low entropy. We use the en-
crypted key exchange technique to defend against dictionary attacks and generate a
high-entropy key.
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• Our system is efficient. The efficiency of our system is twofold: 1) it requires less
human involvement; 2) the computation overhead of our system is not heavy, which
is demonstrated in our evaluation.
1.2.3 Acoustic NFA
The above finger movement based NFA system makes a solid step toward useful NFAs and
is suitable for many scenarios. However, the system suffers from its non-automation and
the human assistance makes the system not suitable for highly frequent authentications.
For example, if a web server adopts smartphone based two-factor authentication (SBTFA),
the browser and the smartphone may want to perform NFA in a high frequency during the
entire web session. In addition, relay attacks pose a serious threat to existing approaches
for proximity authentications. In this study, we present a novel NFA system that restricts
the distance between the two devices to the scale of several centimeters. When the au-
thentication succeeds, the system generate an assertion that can be used as an evidence of
the authentication. Our system explores acoustic communications and can prevent relay
attacks. The generated assertion is a confidential binary sequence known only to the two
devices. Our system is fully automated and light-weight, as demonstrated by extensive
evaluations on a prototype.
Contributions:
• It asserts whether two communicating devices are in the near field (a few centimeters)
of each other. We use the term “near field” instead of “proximity” to emphasize that
the asserted distance can be as small as a few centimeters. A device can prove that it
is in the near field by presenting the assertion to the other party.
• It can prevent relay attacks. Dolphin has an adjustable time window limiting an
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attacker’s relay time. A prudent implementation leaves an attacker no time to relay
messages.
• It requires no extra equipments and can be easily deployed on off-the-shelf devices.
Dolphin is a fully auto- mated system and needs no human interactions.
• A valid near field assertion generated by Dolphin is a binary sequence and confi-
dential to the two devices that execute Dolphin. This property is important for ap-
plications that generate a cryptographic session key based on the devices’ proximity
relations, such as one-time file sharing between two proximate smartphones [3].
• It is light-weight and battery friendly for smartphones.
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Part I
IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION
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CHAPTER 2
User Identity Authentication for Smart Devices
The past few years have witnessed an exponential growth of smartphones, in both technol-
ogy and market shares. According to a research done by canalys [23], smartphones were
sold about 73 million more than personal computers (PCs) in 2011. Compared with PCs,
smartphones are more privately owned. People may share a desktop, but few are willing to
share their smartphones.
At the same time, smartphones are becoming an important personal entrance to var-
ious networks, such as the Internet or online social networks. Many apps and websites now
allow people to store their accounts, profiles, passwords, etc., in smartphones for automatic
re-access. Besides, people also use smartphones to keep contact with friends and families,
take pictures of special moments, and arrange schedules. No one would like to disclose
such information to an untrusted person. However, due to its small size, a smartphone
could be easily taken away by an attacker. The attacker can acquire a good profit from re-
selling stolen smartphones. It is reported by lookout.com that $2.5 billion worth of devices
were lost or stolen in 2011 [67]. Besides, having a victim’s private information, an attacker
can steal the victim’s identity and launch impersonation attacks in networks. Such attacks
substantially threaten the security of the networks, especially online social networks. Im-
personation attacks also threaten most current trust and reputation systems for networks.
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Therefore, protecting smartphones against unauthorized usage has significant meaning to
safeguarding users’ privacy and network security. A smartphone can alert the owner and
lock itself when unauthorized usage is detected, which will inhibit most smartphone thefts.
To prevent unauthorized usage of smartphones, a re-authentication system is more
suitable than an authentication system. An authentication system authenticates a user for
one time when he logs in, such as inputting a password to unlock a smartphone. The
purpose of a re-authentication system is to continuously authenticate the current user during
the whole system execution. In the absence of re-authentication, it is easy for an attacker to
access a smartphone if the owner forgets to lock it and leaves it in a public place. Even if the
smartphone is locked, an attacker can use operating system (OS) flaws to bypass the lock
screen, which is reported to exist in Android [53] and iOS [49] systems. The continuous
protection provided by re-authentication is necessary for smartphones.
A straightforward re-authentication approach is to periodically invoke an authenti-
cation system, such as asking the user to enter a password [106]. This approach interrupts
user-smartphone interactions and leads to bad user experiences. For smartphones, it is
preferable that the re-authentication takes place in a way that users do not “observe” its
existence.
Current short unlock passwords, such as 6-digit numbers, cannot protect smart-
phones against a powerful attacker. However, long and complicated passwords are difficult
to memorize. Hence, a re-authentication system should rely on certain “password” that
is easy to memorize but difficult to forge. A good candidate for such passwords is the
owner’s biological data. Many works have studied biometric-based authentication, such
as fingerprint recognition [27], face recognition [35], and iris recognition [83]. However,
these methods are not suitable for smartphone re-authentication because they either rely on
special equipments, which are not available for smartphones, or need the users to stop in-
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teractions to assist the re-authentication. In addition, continuous face recognition requires
keeping the camera on all the time, which dramatically reduces a smartphone’s battery life.
In this study, we propose a re-authentication system for smartphones using users’
finger movements. The system first learns the owner’s finger movement patterns, keeps
running in the background, continuously monitors the current user’s finger movement, and
compares the current user’s movement patterns against the owner’s patterns. Our system
does not need user assistance in re-authentication and users are not aware of its execution.
The main contributions of our work are as follows:
• We propose and study the unobservable smartphone re-authentication problem. We
design a novel system architecture especially for smartphones to reduce the compu-
tational overhead on smartphones.
• We propose to use the finger movement as a biometric characteristic to authenti-
cate a user. When users use smartphones, the smartphones sense the users’ finger
movements and interpret the sensed data as different gestures. Since users have to
use gestures to interact with smartphones in most cases, our proposed approach can
enforce re-authentication to every user. In addition, our approach can continuously
re-authenticate the current user without being noticed by the user.
• We propose an efficient biometric-based re-authentication system for smartphones
using the classification method. We design the biometric features for the classifi-
cation algorithm and discuss their performance. We implemented our system on
a Motorola Droid smartphone to demonstrate its efficiency. Extensive experiments
were performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the features and the performance of
our system.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the background and
related work in Section 2.1. The attack model is introduced in Section 2.2. We discuss
the design goals for a smartphone re-authentication system in Section 2.3. We present our
re-authentication system in Section 2.4. We discuss the feature design and selection in
Section 2.5. We evaluate our re-authentication system in Section 2.6, and conclude our
work in Section 2.7.
2.1 Background and Related Work
Compared with traditional authentications, biometric-based authentications are easy
to carry out, natural to use, and invulnerable to forgery. Traditional approaches are based
on possessions of secret information, such as passwords. Biometric based approaches make
use of distinct personal features, such as fingerprint or iris.
A biometric-based re-authentication system involves an enrollment phase and a re-
authentication phase. A user is enrolled by providing his biological data. The system learns
patterns from the provided data and stores the learned patterns for future reference. During
the re-authentication phase, the system compares the observed biological data against the
stored data to re-authenticate a user.
Previous studies on biometric-based re-authentication concentrated on either physi-
ological or behavioral features [103]. Physiological biometrics study static physical fea-
tures of humans. Currently, there are many different physiological biometrics for re-
authentication, such as fingerprint [27], face patterns [35], and iris [83]. However, phys-
iological biometric-based re-authentication approaches usually rely on specific devices,
which are unavailable on most smartphones. In addition, most approaches need human as-
sistance in the re-authentication. For example, most face recognition systems need the users
to stay still at a specific angle to the camera during re-authentication. Hence, these physio-
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logical biometric-based approaches cannot achieve continuous unobservable re-authentication.
Behavioral biometrics assume that people have distinct stable patterns on a certain
behavior, such as keystrokes on a keyboard. Behavioral biometric-based re-authentication
uses the behavior patterns to authenticate a user’s identity. For personal computers, most
previous studies concentrated on two operations: keystrokes [16, 74, 75] and mouse move-
ments [54, 107]. Typing actions happen much less frequently on smartphones than on
personal computers, because people hardly use smartphones to do heavy text input. There-
fore, it is difficult to collect a sufficient number of keystrokes on smartphones for re-
authentication.
Although smartphones do not have mouse input devices, previous studies [7, 76]
on mouse movements help us to understand finger movements on smartphones. Hence, we
give more detailed review of prior works on mouse movements.
2.1.1 Mouse Movements
When a mouse moves, the hardware captures the movement and sends the mouse events
to the OS, including raw movement coordinates, button up, and button down events. The
OS interprets these mouse events to a series of point data, which form a mouse movement.
In the approach proposed by Ahmed and Traore, point data are aggregated as point-and-
click or drag-and-drop actions [6, 7]. A point-and-click action contains a click event and
a mouse movement following the click. A drag-and-drop action is a mouse movement
with one button pressed down. The reason to study the two actions is that they are both
performed intentionally by users. Ahmed and Traore characterized each action using action
type, moving distance, duration, and direction [7]. They computed 39 dynamics related
features and used a neural network to classify new observed actions.
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Recently, Zheng et al. [107] proposed to use only the point-and-click action and
three features: direction, angle of curvature, and curvature distance, to authenticate a user.
The classifier they used is SVM. They aggregated the features of 20 point-and-click actions
as a feature vector. Their work required 20 mouse movements, compared with 2000 mouse
movements required in Ahmed and Traore’s work [7]. This reduction decreases the data
collection time and hence increases the re-authentication frequency. In their work, they
collected 81218 point-and-click actions from 30 users in a controllable environment and
one hour raw mouse events from 1074 anonymous users from an online forum. The average
false rejection rate and the average false acceptance rate were both 1.3% in their tests.
In another approach, Pusara and Brodley utilized the connections between each pair
of points within a window of a configurable size [82]. The features, such as angle, distance,
and speed, were extracted from the points rather than the actions. They used C5.0 decision
tree as the classifier in their system, which achieved an average false acceptance rate of
0.43% and an average false rejection rate of 1.75% in the experiments on an eleven-user
data set. Gamboa and Fred [39] aggregated the points between two clicks. Each click is
represented by 63 features. For each user, they proposed a greedy approach to reduce the
feature set to a best fit subset.
2.1.2 Smartphone Features
One of the biggest differences between personal computers and smartphones is that smart-
phones are equipped with many sensors, such as multi-touch screen, accelerometer, and gy-
roscope. Although different smartphones may have different sensors, multi-touch screen,
accelerometer, and compass are provided by most smartphones.
Multi-touch screen is a basic equipment on a smartphone. A multi-touch screen is able to
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respond to more than one finger touch. The number of supported touch points varies
from device to device. Some basic screens can only support two touch points while
some advanced ones are able to support up to ten touch points. The multi-touch
screen records the touch position, touch area, and touch pressure, packs them as a
single touch event, and sends it to the OS. A series of touch events are connected
together and recognized as different gestures, such as sliding, tap, double tap, or
spread.
Accelerometer measures the phone’s acceleration on three axis, x, y, and z [42]. This
captures a smartphone position in a three-dimensional space.
Orientation indicates whether a smartphone is held in portrait mode or landscape mode.
Compass measures the position of magnetic north in relation to the X, Y, and Z axies of
the phone.
Various sensors in smartphones provide a lot of biological data of a user, which can be used
in biometric-based authentication. Some previous works have studied using smartphone
sensors for security purpose. Some works used accelerometer to sense a person’s shake
motion data to securely pair two devices [25, 72]. Ma¨ntyja¨rvi et al. first considered using
sensors to record users’ behavioral patterns and to continuously re-authenticate a user [71].
They suggested to use accelerometer and orientation sensors to monitor a user’s walking
patterns. Their approach can successfully recognize a user at rates between 60% and 85%.
Okumura et al. proposed to authenticate a user using the accelerometer data sensed when
the user is swinging his arm [79]. Instead of using the false acceptance rate or the false
rejection rate, they claimed their system’s equal error rate – the error rate when the false
acceptance rate is equal to the false rejection rate – was able to achieve as low as 5%.
Recently, Conti et al. proposed to re-authenticate a user using the arm movement patterns,
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sensed by the accelerometer and orientation sensors, while the user is making a phone call
[30]. They achieved a false acceptance rate of 4.44% and a false rejection rate of 9.33% in
their tests.
Recently, Biometric Signature ID company has proposed to use gesture based sig-
nature to re-authenticate a user in the log-in phase [17]. This approach records a user’s
signature during the enrollment phase and compares an input signature against the recorded
one during re-authentication. Luca et al. [33] proposed to use gesture information, such as
touching area or duration, as an additional re-authentication approach on top of the current
password pattern approach. The two methods are both one time re-authentication and will
interrupt user-smartphone interactions if they want to achieve continuous re-authentication.
Different from these works, our system aims to provide a continuous unobservable re-
authentication.
Existing continuous re-authentication approaches have paid extensive attention to
the accelerometer and orientation sensors and used behaviors that may not happen during
an attack in our scenario. For example, an impostor may not swing arms when he uses a
victim’s smartphone. Therefore, we need an approach that can continuously re-authenticate
a user as long as he is using the smartphone. We propose to use and monitor the gesture
on smartphone touch screen, which is the most important and necessary interface between
users and the smartphone OS.
2.1.3 Smartphone Gesture Patterns
Here we first give several observations on smartphone gestures, which differentiate the
finger movement on smartphones from the mouse movement on computers.
Usage Intermittence: people may not always use smartphones for a long time.
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Typical usages are to wake up a smartphone, click an email app, check if there is any
new email, and then turn off the screen. The collected gestures are thus not temporarily
continuous.
Spacial Disconnection: In the study on mouse movement patterns, each movement
can be captured by hardwares and used to formulate patterns, such as the point-and-click
patterns. On smartphones, not every finger movement can be captured by a touch screen.
For example, a user lifts up his finger, moves in the air, and clicks a link on a webpage. In
these cases, the screen cannot capture the finger movement in the air, which corresponds to
the point action in mouse movements.
Orientation Dependent: Users may use smartphones in either portrait or landscape
orientations. Users’ gestures have different patterns in different orientations. For example,
a sliding up distance becomes shorter in the landscape mode.
2.2 Attack Model
We consider an attacker who has physical access to the smartphone and wants to
use the resources in it, such as applications or music. For example, an attacker may steal
a victim’s smartphone and enjoy the music in it without paying any money. The attacker
may also steal the network account information and the personal information stored in the
smartphone. For example, the attacker can post a fake message in a social network using
the victim’s account. The purpose of our work is to design a continuous re-authentication
system running in the background. The system keeps authenticating the current user in an
unobservable way, i.e., it does not interrupt the user’s interactions with the smartphone.
In this paper, we only consider the authentication of a user against the smartphone owner,
because a smartphone is usually privately owned and not shared by multiple users. If the
user is found to be a stranger, the re-authentication system alerts the OS.
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2.3 Design Goals
We summarize the goals that a smartphone re-authentication system should achieve
in the following.
• Continuity: A smartphone re-authentication system should keep authenticating the
current user as long as the smartphone is being used.
• Unobservability: A smartphone re-authentication system should neither interrupt
user-smartphone interactions nor need human assistance during re-authentication.
• Light-weight: A smartphone re-authentication system should not need intensive
computations on smartphones.
2.4 Approach
We are ready to present our smartphone re-authentication system, which achieves
the design goals discussed in the above section.
Our idea stems from the observation that users’ finger movements on smartphone
screens are different from person to person when they use smartphones. For example, some
people like to use the index finger to slide up the content displayed on the screen while some
people prefer to use the thumb. Following customs in smartphone development, we call a
continuous finger movement on the screen a gesture. We assume that a user’s gestures
contain his distinct behavioral characteristics.
Our work uses such characteristics to re-authenticate users. We illustrate our system
architecture in Figure 2.1. Considering the limited computational and storage resources in
a smartphone, our system is divided into two modules, the re-authentication module and the
training module. The re-authentication module is deployed in a smartphone and the training
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Figure 2.1: System Architecture
module is executed on a PC. To provide a better security and performance guarantee, we
suggest to implement the re-authentication module as part of the smartphone OS services
in practice.
The re-authentication module keeps running in the background of smartphones. It
monitors a user’s raw touch event data and sends it to the preprocessing component, which
assembles every single raw data into different gestures and then sends them to the feature
extraction component. The latter component extracts features from the gesture data, forms
a feature vector, and feeds it into the predictor component. Finally, the predictor component
makes a prediction. If the feature vector is predicted to be from the smartphone owner, this
re-authentication is passed. Otherwise, an alert message will be sent to the OS. Different
OSs may take different actions in response to the alert. One possible action is to lock the
system and ask the user to input an administrator password. Another possible action is to
send a message, with the current GPS information in it, to the owner’s e-mail box.
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The predictor component consists of a classifier and multiple classification mod-
ules, as shown in Figure 2.2. A classifier is a classification algorithm that uses an object’s
feature vector to identify which class the object belongs to. The classification algorithm
used in our work is the support vector machine (SVM) algorithm. Each classification mod-
ule is in charge of a main gesture type or a combination of a main gesture type and an
auxiliary type. A classification module is a file containing parameters for the classification
algorithm and determines the classifier’s functionality. The basic classification algorithm is
embedded in the classifier. Using different classification modules, the classifier can make
predictions on feature vectors of different gesture types. When a feature vector is fed in,
the classifier chooses a corresponding classification module and makes a prediction.
classifierfeature 
vector prediction
Module 1 Module 2 Module 3 Module n
Figure 2.2: Predictor Component
The training module is executed on the owner’s PC, because it requires significant
computations. When a smartphone owner first enrolls in the system, the system collects
the owner’s gesture features by using the touch monitoring, preprocessing, and feature ex-
traction components of the re-authentication module. Our system deploys a trusted data
server to collect feature data from smartphone owners and downloads them to the train-
ing modules when necessary. To protect an owner’s privacy, the data collection is done
anonymously. This can be achieved by using anonymous group messaging [31, 104]. A
fixed number of a user’s feature data and a time stamp form a ready-to-submit feature mes-
sage. Every user in our system is a group member and the server is the data collector in
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the anonymous group messaging system. The users collaboratively shuffle their messages
before the messages are handed in to the server. Eventually, the server does not know the
connection between a message and its owner. In this way, a user’s training module can use
other users’ feature data but has no way to know the user identities. We note that a user only
wants to download other users’ feature data. Therefore, a user compares every downloaded
feature message against his own submissions and drops the one that is the same with one of
his submissions. The comparison can be based on the hash value of the messages to reduce
the time and storage overhead.
The training module uses the owner’s features and other people’s features in the
training algorithm to obtain classification modules. After training, the classification mod-
ules are downloaded onto the smartphone. The training module anonymously uploads the
owner’s data to the trusted server and obtains anonymous features from it. We note that this
trusted data server does not participate in the re-authentication and is only needed when an
owner wants to re-train his classification modules, which is done offline and on-demand.
Therefore, our system does not pose a high requirement on the communication delay be-
tween smartphones and the server.
An owner’s usage pattern usually stays stable. But sometimes, the owner may
change his usage pattern over weeks or months, which may cause more false alarms. When
this happens, the classification modules need to be re-trained. To keep the modules up
to date, our system also allows an on-demand re-training. When the owner requests a re-
training, the re-authentication module captures the owner’s gestures, calculates and uploads
the owner’s feature vectors to the training module. The training module then downloads
anonymous feature messages from the server, filters out his own submissions, and runs the
classifier training algorithm again to obtain new classification modules.
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We note that the access to the system enrollment and re-training process should
be restricted to the smartphone owner only. This can be achieved, for example, by using
traditional password based protection.
2.5 Characterizing Gestures
Our system monitors five types of gestures: sliding up, sliding down, sliding left,
sliding right, and tap, as shown in Figure 2.3. Usually, slidings are used to move contents
sliding 
right
sliding 
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sliding 
down
sliding 
up
tap
Figure 2.3: Five Essential Gestures
displayed on the screen and tap is used to click a link or a button within the contents. Al-
though there are some other gestures, such as double tap, spread, and pinch, the five gesture
types are the most often used types when users interact with smartphones. We collected 75
users’ gestures when they used smartphones. We show the proportions of different gesture
types in a pie chart in Figure 2.4. It shows that the above five types of gestures take a
dominant part of all the gestures. In other words, most users inevitably used at least one of
the above gesture types when they used smartphones. As shown in Figure 2.4, slidings and
taps occupy 88.8% of all the gestures. We remark that we do not consider virtual keyboard
strokes here, because they are not suitable for smartphone re-authentications. Keystroke
based authentications usually need a number of continuous keystrokes, but most users do
not continuously input many texts on smartphones. In addition, an attacker can use a vic-
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Figure 2.4: Pie Chart for Collected Gestures
tim’s smartphone without many continuous keystrokes.
Users can hold smartphones in either portrait mode or landscape mode. As pointed
out in Section 2.1.3, the orientation mode affects a user’s gesture patterns. Hence, our
system has two classification modules for every gesture to deal with each orientation mode.
2.5.1 Data Collection
The open-source Android system is selected as our implementation platform. Specifically,
all of our experiments and data collections were carried out on Android 2.2.2. The first
thing we need is a program that can monitor a user’s finger movements in the background.
However, for security reasons, Android requires that only the topmost apps can obtain
touch events, dispatched from the Android system management service. In other words,
we cannot enjoy the convenience that Android API provides to developers and have to
work around this problem. We found that Android relies on Linux kernel for core system
services, including the maintenance of hardware drivers [41]. When some touch event
happens, a screen reads in raw data and sends it to the Linux kernel. The kernel then
packages the raw data and sends it to the upper layer Android library. Since we cannot get
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input data from Android API, our idea is to read input data directly from lower layer Linux
kernel.
Linux kernel uses device files to manage devices, located under the directory /dev/.
Same as other devices, a multi-touch screen also has a corresponding device file, say
/dev/event3. When the multi-touch screen reads inputs, the data are put in the device file
by the kernel. The data orgnization follows the Linux multi-touch event protocol [86]. In
the protocol, touch details, such as position, touch area, pressure, etc., are sent sequentially
as Linux ABS event packets [86]. Each packet contains an ABS event indicating a specific
touch data. Packets are separated by a SYN_MT_REPORT event (type 0002). When all touch
packets in a multi-touch action arrive, a SYN_REPORT event (type 0000) is generated. A
typical multi-touch ABS packet is as follows:
0003 0030 00000005
0003 0032 00000018
0003 0035 000002b6
0003 0036 00000296
0000 0002 00000000
0003 0030 00000003
0003 0032 00000012
0003 0035 0000024d
0003 0036 000001e4
0000 0002 00000000
0000 0000 00000000
The first byte indicates the event type: 0003 is an ABS event and 0000 is an SYN event.
The second byte indicates the data type: 0030 is ABS_MT_TOUCH_MAJOR major axis of
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touch ellipse; 0032 is ABS_MT_WIDTH_MAJOR major axis of approaching ellipse; 0035 and
0036 are ABS_MT_POSITION_X and ABS_MT_POSITION_Y, respectively, giving the cen-
tral position of an ellipse. These four basic data types are supported by all Android
smartphones. Other data types include ABS_MT_TOUCH_MINOR, ABS_MT_WIDTH_MINOR,
ABS_MT_ORIENTATION, ABS_MT_TOOL_TYPE, ABS_MT_BLOB_ID, and ABS_MT_TRACKING_ID.
The multi-touch protocol recognizes a finger touch area as an ellipse and describes it using
its major and minor axises. Some low-end devices, such as the Motorola Droid smartphone
we used, recognize a touch area as a circle and omit the minor axis value. TOUCH type data
describes the area that a finger directly contacts the screen and WIDTH type data describes
the shape of a finger itself. The ration of ABS_MT_TOUCH_MAJOR/ABS_MT_WIDTH_MAJOR
gives the touch pressure. The last two bytes in each line represent the data value. The
above packet contains two finger data details, separated by 0000 0002 00000000.
Our monitoring program needs the root privilege to hack into the lower layer of an
Android system. Such a re-authentication system is usually integrated into the OS and can
be granted the root privilege by the OS.
We carried out our data collection and all the experiments on two Motorola Droid
phones, with 550MHz A8 processor, 256MB memory, 16GB sdcard, and Android 2.2.2
OS. In order to collect gesture data, 75 users were invited to take away our smartphones
for days and use them freely. We did not specify any requirement on the usage and let
the users use the smartphone in any way they feel comfortable. The users can browse web
pages, including news, online forums, social network websites, etc., or use the installed
apps, such as twitter, facebook, google reader, etc. Users were not required to continuously
use the smartphone. They could lock the smartphone and resume using it later. In summary,
we want the participants to use smartphones in the same way that they use their personal
smartphones in their daily life.
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2.5.2 Metric Design
Good features are critical to a supervised machine learning approach, which is used in our
system. In this section, we design the metrics to characterize the five types of gestures. In
Section 2.5.3, we test whether a metric is good and drop the bad ones. A feature is the
average metric value over a block of gesture data.
2.5.2.1 Metrics of Sliding
First, we inspect what happens during a sliding gesture. Figure 2.5 shows the sensed data
of a sliding gesture, a sliding up, recorded by our touch monitoring component. We note
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Figure 2.5: A Sliding Up Gesture
that the coordinate on the smartphone platform puts the origin at the top left corner of a
screen. Each circle represents a finger touch, because Motorola Droid phone views a finger
touch as a circle. The size of a circle shows the size of the touch area and the brightness
of a circle shows the strength of the touch pressure. The movement starts at point F and
ends at point C. The time between every pair of circles is the same. Apparently, the finger
moves slowly at first, then faster, because the circles become sparser as the finger moves.
Our first interesting observation – which is different from our intuition – is that the
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maximum touch area may not happen at the first touch and the minimum pressure may
not happen at the last touch. As can be seen from the figure, the touch point P has the
largest touch area and point Q has the smallest touch pressure, both of which are neither
the first touch nor the last touch. Another observation is that strong pressures happen at the
beginning of a sliding. Despite the first 5 points, the variations of touch pressures are not
as big as that of touch areas.
We propose the following metrics for a sliding gesture:
• First touch position: the coordinates, x and y, of the starting point in a sliding.
• First touch pressure: the pressure of the first touch.
• First touch area: the touch area of the first touch.
• First moving direction: the moving direction of a touch point is the angle between
the horizontal line and the line crossing the point and its succeeding point. The angle
α in Figure 2.5 is the moving direction of point A. First moving direction is the
moving direction of the starting point.
• Moving distance: the total distance of the sliding gesture. Particularly, it is the
summation of the distances between every two continuous touch points.
• Duration: the time duration of the whole sliding gesture.
• Average moving direction: the average value of all the point’s moving directions.
We note that the last point is not counted, because it does not have a moving direction.
• Average moving curvature: given any three temporally continuous touch points,
such as A, B, and C in Figure 2.5, the corresponding moving curvature is angle∠ABC.
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The average value of the moving curvatures in the sliding gesture is selected as a
metric.
• Average curvature distance: given any three consecutive points, such as A, B, and
C in Figure 2.5, the corresponding curvature distance is the distance from point B to
line AC. We take the average of all the curvature distances as a metric.
• Average Pressure: the average of all the touch pressures in the sliding gesture.
• Average touch area: average of all the touch areas.
• Max-area portion: we index all the points according to the time order, starting from
1. The max-area proportion of the sliding gesture is the index of the max area touch
point divided by the total number of the points in the sliding. This metric reflects
which portion of the sliding contains the maximum touch point.
• Min-pressure portion: Similar to max-area portion, the min-pressure portion is the
index of the minimum pressure touch point divided by the total number of the points.
The final feature vector is calculated over a block of sliding gestures. The block size is
denoted by ns. Each feature value in the feature vector corresponds to an average metric
value over the block of sliding gestures.
2.5.2.2 Metrics of Tap
Tap is a simple gesture and does not provide much information about a user’s finger move-
ment patterns. In contrast to our intuition, many tap gestures contain more than one touch
points. It is due to the screen’s high sample frequency and the slight tremble of a user’s
fingertip when he is touching above the screen. The metrics for a given tap gesture are as
follows:
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• Average touch area: the average of all the touch areas.
• Duration: time duration of the tap gesture.
• Average pressure: the average of all the touch pressures.
Similar to the calculation of a sliding feature vector, a tap feature vector is also the average
metric values over a block of tap gestures. The block size is denoted by nt .
2.5.3 Metric Selection
According to our observations about users’ behaviors of using smartphones, we proposed
different metrics in Section 2.5.2, trying to characterize a user’s gestures. Selecting good
metrics is essential for a supervised machine learning method, such as SVM used in this
work. In this section, we test the performance of each metric and drop the bad metrics. If
a metric can be used to easily distinguish two users, we say the metric is a good metric.
We view a metric value calculated from a person’s gesture as a data sampled from an
underlying distribution of the metric. For a metric to distinguish two different persons,
it is necessary to require the two underlying distributions to be different. Therefore, for
a metric, we construct a metric data set for each invited user in the data collection by
calculating the metric value from each of his sliding gestures. Then, we tested whether two
metric data sets are from the same distribution. If most pairs of the data sets are from the
same distribution, the metric is bad in distinguishing two persons and we need to drop it.
We use two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) to test if two metric data
sets are significantly different. Two-sample K-S test is a nonparametric statistical hypoth-
esis testing based on maximum distance between the empirical cumulative distribution
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functions of the two data sets. The two hypotheses of K-S test are:
H0 : the two data sets are from the same distribution;
H1 : the two data sets are from different distributions.
A K-S test reports a p-value, i.e. the probability that obtaining the maximum distance is at
least as large as the observed one when H0 is assumed to be true. If this p-value is smaller
than a significant level α , usually set to 0.05, we will reject H0 hypothesis because events
with small probabilities happen rarely. For each metric, we calculated the p-value for each
pair of the metric data sets and drop the metric if most of its p-values are greater than α .
2.5.3.1 Sliding Gesture
Figure 2.5 shows the testing results for the metrics of the four sliding gestures in both
portrait and landscape modes. Due to space limitation, we abbreviate some metric names
in the figures. firstPress is “first touch pressure”, firstArea “first touch area”, firstDirect
“first moving direction”, distance “moving distance”, avgCurv “average moving curva-
ture”, avrgCurvDist “average curvature distance”, avrgDirect “average moving direction”,
avrgPress “average pressure”, pressMin “min-pressure portion”, avrgArea “average touch
area”, and areaMax “max-area portion”.
For each metric, the resulting p-values are drawn in a box plot. The bottom and
the top of the box denote the lower quartile Q1 and the upper quartile Q2, defined as
the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the p-values. The middle bar denotes the median of
the p-values. The lowest and the highest bars outside the box denote the lower and the
upper outer fences, defined as 4Q1− 3Q2 and 4Q2− 3Q1, respectively. The results from
portrait orientation are represented by yellow boxes and those from landscape orientation
are represented by green boxes. The y-axes in Figure 2.5 are drawn in logarithmic scale.
The red dashed line in each subfigure represents the significance level α . Hence, the better
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(b) Sliding down gestures
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(c) Sliding left gestures
a metric is, the more portion of its box plot is below the red line. It denotes that more pairs
are significantly different.
We initially thought touch pressures should be a good metric to distinguish differ-
ent people. However, from Figure 2.5, we can see that none of the three pressure related
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(d) Sliding right gestures
Figure 2.5: K-S Test on Sliding Metrics
metrics, first touch pressure, average pressure, and min pressure portion, is a good metric
because at least half of their p-values are above the red line in all of the four subfigures.
This means that the pressure data is bad in distinguishing two different persons. Besides,
Figure 2.5 also shows that average curvature distance is a bad metric. The remaining met-
rics have most of their p-values below the red line, indicating that most data sets are sig-
nificantly different to one another in the statistical sense. Therefore, we finally select first
touch position, first touch area, first moving direction, moving distance, duration, average
moving direction, average moving curvature, average touch area, and max-area portion as
the metrics for sliding features.
Next, we tested the correlation between each pair of metrics. A strong correlation
between a pair of metrics indicates that they are similar in describing a person’s gesture
pattern. In other words, a weak correlation implies that the selected metrics reflect the
different characters of the desired gestures. For each user’s gesture data set in one orienta-
tion, we calculated Pearson’s correlation coefficient between each two metrics. Then, for
each two metrics, we took the average of all resulting correlation coefficients between the
two metrics. The average is taken over different users and different orientations. Figure
2.6 shows the resulting average coefficients. Each subfigure can be viewed as a 10 by 10
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Figure 2.6: Correlations Between Each Pair of Metrics of Sliding Gestures
matrix and shows two sliding types using an upper triangle and a lower triangle, respec-
tively. A pie chart in a triangle denotes the average correlation coefficient between the two
metrics. The names of the metrics are listed on the top and the left sides. For a pie chart,
blue represents a positive correlation and red represents a negative correlation. A larger
shaded area in a pie chart indicates a stronger correlation. From the figure, we can see that
most correlations are weak correlations and there are more positive correlations than nega-
tive correlations. We note that the correlation between the average touch area and the first
touch area is remarkably positive in sliding up and sliding right. This is because people’s
first touch usually affects the remaining touches in a sliding gesture. If a person touches
hard at first, it is quite possible that he will continue touching hard the rest of the sliding.
However, we are not going to delete any of the two metrics because the correlation is not
strong enough in sliding down and sliding left.
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2.5.3.2 Tap Gesture
Tap gesture is a simple gesture. Hence, we do not design many metrics for it. Figure 2.7a
shows the K-S test results on each tap metric. It is obvious that the average touch area
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Figure 2.7: K-S Test on Tap Metrics and the Correlations Between the Metrics
metric and the average touch pressure metric are not good in distinguishing users, because
their medians are above the significance level. The median of p-values of the duration
metric is just a little below the significance level. In summary, the tap metrics are not as
good as the sliding metrics. The reason is that a tap gesture is usually so quick and simple
that it provides few distinct features. The average correlation coefficients between every
two metrics are shown in Figure 2.7b. We can see that the correlations between each pair
of metrics are not strong, i.e. every coefficient is smaller than 0.5. Therefore, using tap
gesture as a single gesture to re-authenticate a user is not reliable and may cause high error
rates. Therefore, we propose to use tap as an auxiliary gesture. If the desired number of
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taps are captured, our system combines the tap feature vector together with a sliding feature
vector to enhance the authentication accuracy.
2.5.4 Designing Modules
As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the predictor component contains several classification mod-
ules, each of which can independently re-authenticate a user. In Table 2.1, we list the
gesture or gestures used in each module. In total, we have 16 classification modules in the
Table 2.1: Classification Modules and the Corresponding Gesture Types
PORTRAIT LANDSCAPE
No. gestures No. gestures
1. sliding up 2. sliding up
3. sliding down 4. sliding down
5. sliding left 6. sliding left
7. sliding right 8. sliding right
9. sliding up + tap 10. sliding up + tap
11. sliding down + tap 12. sliding down + tap
13. sliding left + tap 14. sliding left + tap
15. sliding right + tap 16. sliding right + tap
predictor component – 8 modules for portrait mode and 8 modules for landscape mode. In
each orientation mode, we use 4 modules to classify 4 sliding types. Another 4 modules
are used to classify the combination of a sliding gesture and a tap gesture. Each module
sends an alert to the OS if it finds the feature vector to be abnormal.
As pointed out in Section 2.5.2, a feature vector consists of the average metric
values taken over a block of gestures. The block sizes are different for slidings and taps,
denoted by ns and nt , respectively. For example, when a sliding up gesture is captured in
portrait mode by the gesture monitor component, 10 metric values will be extracted and
stored as a group. If there are already ns such groups, average values are calculated by
metric and fed into the classifier as a feature vector. The classifier uses module 1 to classify
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the feature vector. If it is an abnormal vector, an alert message will be sent out to the OS.
If there is a new portrait tap feature vector ready as well, it will be combined with the
sliding feature vector and the classifier will use module 9 instead. We emphasize that our
system does not require the block of gestures to be temporally close to each other. In other
words, any ns sliding up gestures can be used to calculate a feature vector. This property
of our system is important to smartphone usage because most people use smartphones
intermittently. For example, a user may turn on his smartphone, check emails, and turn it
off. There may be only a few sliding gestures in this operation cycle. Therefore, gestures
are usually collected group by group and there may be a long time interval between two
groups.
2.6 Evaluations
In this section, we are about to evaluate the performance of the proposed identity
authentication scheme on a prototype. We first introduce the necessary details to set up the
evaluations and show the evaluation results in the follow-up section.
2.6.1 Setup
We used the SVM algorithm as the classification algorithm in the system and selected
LIBSVM [26] as our implementation. For two-class classification tasks, the SVM finds a
hyperplane in training inputs to separate two different data point sets such that the margins
are maximized. A margin is the distance from the hyperplane to a boundary data point.
The boundary point is called a support vector and there may be many support vectors.
Sometimes, we need to map the original data points to a higher dimensional space by using
a kernel function so as to make training inputs easier to separate. The kernel function used
in our SVM is the Gaussian radial basis function K(xa, xb) = e−γ||xa−xb||
2
, where γ is equal
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to the reciprocal of the feature number. In our classification modules, we label the owner’s
data as a positive class and all other users’ data as a negative class. SVM has been used in
security area [105].
As described in Section 2.5.1, 75 people participated in our data collection. The
participants are either students in or visitors to our lab building. We recorded the demor-
graphics — education, gender, and age range — of the participants and show them in Figure
2.8. All our participants are older than 20 years old. Here, education is the highest degree
that a participant has or is pursuing. The numbers in the pie chart are the numbers of the
participants in the corresponding category.
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Figure 2.8: Demographics of the 75 participants
Among them, 28 people are target users who were asked to use the smartphones till
at least 150 sliding up gestures, 150 sliding down gestures, 150 sliding right gestures, 150
sliding left gestures, and 300 tap gestures were collected. Other people, called non-target
users, were asked to use the phone till the total using time hit 15 minutes. The target users
are CSE graduate students at Arizona State University. The demographics of the target
users are listed in Table. 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Demorgraphics of the Target Users
Category # of users
Education
Master students 2
Ph. D. students 26
Gender
Female 9
Male 19
Age
20-25 10
25-30 15
30-35 3
In our experiments, we generated training and testing data sets for each target user.
For a specific gesture type and a target user, the user’s corresponding gesture data set was
divided into two halves. In each half, we randomly selected a block of gesture data of
necessary size, such as ns for sliding up gestures, and calculated the feature vector. The
vector was labeled as a positive feature vector. We generated training positive feature
vectors using the first half gesture data set and testing positive feature vectors using the
other half gesture data set. In order to generate negative feature vectors, we divided the
remaining target users and the non-target users into two halves, respectively. The first
half of the target users and the first half of the non-target users consisted of the training
user pool. The remaining users consisted of the testing user pool. To generate a training
(testing) negative class feature vector, we first randomly chose a user from the training
(testing) user pool, then randomly selected a block of gestures from the user’s gesture set,
and finally calculated a feature vector, labeled as negative. We dropped a feature vector if
the selected gesture block was previously used. Training feature vectors, including positive
and negative ones, were put together in a training data set and testing feature vectors were
in a testing data set. We remark that positive training and testing feature vectors were
generated from two disjoint sets of gestures. For negative feature vectors, the users used to
generate testing vectors are totally different from those used to generate training vectors.
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Hence, in our experiments, the feature vectors used to test a classification module are never
met by the module in its training phase.
2.6.2 Experiment Results
In this section, we test the classification performance of our system under different sys-
tem parameters. We also implemented the re-authentication module on a Motorola Droid
smartphone to test its computation overhead.
During data collection, we did not put any usage restrictions on the participants.
Users were free to walk, sit, travel by vehicle, or perform other common activities, while
they were using our smartphones.
2.6.2.1 Usage Environments
A smartphone may be used in different environments, such as in a moving vehicle. We are
interested in whether a metric stays same in different usage environments, i.e., whether two
metric data sets, which are obtained in two environments, are from the same distribution.
We carried out the experiments in three normal usage environments, sitting, walking, and
in a moving vehicle. We did not test some extreme usage environments, such as running,
because users usually do not use their smartphones in such environments. We asked a
volunteer to use the smartphone in each of the three environments, respectively, till the
enough gestures were captured. For sitting and walking, the volunteer used the smartphone
while he was sitting still or walking around. For the moving vehicle environment, the
volunteer used the smartphone while he was sitting in the back seat of a moving city bus.
Given a necessary metric, a gesture type, and a holing mode (portrait or landscape), we
obtained a metric data set for each usage environment. We compared each pair of data
sets by using K-S test, as introduced in Section 2.5.3, which results in a p-value for each
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(c) Sliding left gestures
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(d) Sliding right gestures
Figure 2.8: K-S Test on Sliding Metrics in Different Environments. p: portrait; l: land-
scape; w: walking; d: driving; s: sitting; w-s: w vs. s; d-s: d vs. s; w-d: w vs. d.
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Figure 2.9: K-S Test on Tap Features in Different Usage Environments.
comparison. A higher p-value indicates the two data sets are more likely to be from the
same distribution. When the p-value is smaller than a significant level α = 0.05, the two
data sets are thought to be from different distributions. The results for sliding gestures and
tap gestures are shown in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9, respectively.
The red dotted line in each figure denotes the significant level α = 0.05. From
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the figures, it can be seen that most p-values are greater than 0.05, indicating that the two
metric data sets in those comparisons are from the same distribution. In other words, most
metrics stay the same in different usage environments. This is because that users usually
walk slowly while they are looking at smartphones and hold the smartphones more firmly
while in a moving vehicle. Among four sliding gestures, the sliding right gesture is more
vulnerable to the environment change, because it has 15 p-vales under the significant level.
Tap gesture has only 4 p-values under the significant level.
In the data collection, we did not put any usage restrictions on the participants. A
participant may carry out the collection in multiple usage environments. Therefore, the
collected data is mixed with respect to the usage environments.
2.6.2.2 Gesture Block Size
A feature vector is calculated over a block of gestures. The block size is thus an important
system parameter, which determines the number of gestures that our system needs to collect
to perform a re-authentication. Hence, the size determines our system’s re-authentication
frequency. For each gesture type, we changed the necessary block size from 2 to 20. Given
a block size and a gesture, for each target user, we generated 400 positive feature vectors
and 400 negative ones in the training data set and the testing data set, respectively. We
trained the classifier using a training data set, obtained a classification module, tested it
using the testing set, and recorded false acceptance rates and false rejection rates. A false
acceptance rate is the fraction of the testing data that is negative but classified as positive.
A false rejection rate is the fraction of the testing data that is positive but classified as
negative. In the sense of protecting smartphones, a false acceptance is more harmful than
a false rejection. For each gesture type, we take the average false acceptance rates and
the average false rejection rates over all target users’ results. The results are shown in
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Figure 2.10, which contains the two smartphones orientation modes, portrait mode and
landscape mode. We note that, in this experiment, we took tap gesture as a single re-
authentication gesture type and used its feature vectors to obtain a classification module
in order to show its classifying accuracy. For each mode, we show the change of the
average false acceptance rates and the average false rejection rates of each gesture type
with increment of the block size. From the figure, we can see that, for a sliding gesture,
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Figure 2.10: False Acceptance Rate/ False Rejection Rate vs. Gesture Block Size
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its false acceptance and false rejection rates get stable when the block size is greater than
14. In both modes, the two rates of tap gesture are approaching stable when block size is
getting close to 20 although they are not as stable as sliding gestures. Among the five types,
tap has the worst performance, having the highest false acceptance rates and false rejection
rates in both modes. This also confirms our previous analysis of the tap metrics in Section
2.5.3.2.
2.6.2.3 Training Size
The size of a training data set affects a module’s classification accuracy, because a larger
training data set gives the classification algorithm more information. We tested the per-
formance of each classification module under different training set sizes, from 100 to 700
at intervals of 100. In the feature generation, we selected block size ns = 14 and nt = 20
to generate feature vectors. Our system monitors both portrait mode and landscape mode
in the background, using 8 classification modules for each mode (Section 2.5.4). Given
a training set size and a classification module, for each target user, we used the approach
introduced in Section 2.6.1 to generate a training data set and a testing data set. Each test-
ing data set was of the same size as its corresponding training data set. For each training
set size, we obtained 16 classification modules for each user. We tested each classification
module and recorded the classification accuracy. Then for each module and each training
set size, we took the average of all user’s classification accuracies. The results are shown
in Figure 2.11. From Figure 2.11a, we can see that when the training set size increases,
the accuracy of a classification module first increases, approaches to a maximum point,
and then decreases. We observe that the maximum point is around 500 for single gesture
type modules and around 300 for combinatory gesture type modules. The same trend is
observed on the results under landscape mode in Figure 2.11b. The observations indicate
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Figure 2.11: Training Set Size vs. Classification Accuracy
that tap gestures provided extra useful information to a combinatory gesture type module
and the module thus did not need more training data to learn a user’s patterns. The accuracy
decreases after the training set size passes the maximum point because a large training data
set makes the module specific to the training data so that it makes more errors in prediction.
Besides, we list the average classification accuracy for each classification module
in Table 2.3 when the training size is 500 for single gesture type modules and 300 for
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combinational gesture type modules.
Table 2.3: Classification accuracy
PORTRAIT LANDSCAPE
gestures Accuracy gestures Accuracy
sliding up 95.78% sliding up 83.60%
sliding down 95.30% sliding down 94.20%
sliding left 93.06% sliding left 93.97%
sliding right 92.56% sliding right 91.27%
up + tap 93.02% up + tap 92.05%
down + tap 89.25% down + tap 86.25%
left + tap 88.28% left + tap 79.74%
right + tap 89.66% right + tap 91.50%
2.6.2.4 Using Tap
In the study of classification, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is a good
way to graphically reflect the performance of a binary classifier. It is a plot of true positive
rate T P/(T P+FN) versus false positive rate FP/(FP+T N). Here, T P,FN,FP, and T N
are the number of true positive predictions, false negative predictions, false positive pre-
dictions, and true negative predictions, respectively. A true positive prediction is a correct
prediction on a positive class. False positive, true negative, and false negative predictions
are defined in the similar fashion. Generally, if a ROC curve is close to the top-left corner,
it indicates the corresponding classifier can obtain a high true positive rate with a low false
positive rate. Therefore, such a classifier is considered to be a good classifier.
We fixed a target person and drew 16 ROC curves for his 16 classification modules.
We set ns = 14 and nt = 20. The training data set size and the testing data set size were
both 400 for all the 16 modules. The results are shown in Figure 2.12. The purpose is
to test the improvement of using tap gesture as an auxiliary as well as the performance
of each classification module. In all the plots, we can see that most modules having tap
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Figure 2.12: ROC Curves for 16 Classification Modules
as an auxiliary gesture perform better than the ones having only sliding gesture types.
For example, in Figure 2.12a, two modules having tap gestures (red and yellow lines) are
closer to the top-left corner than the other two lines. At the same time, we notice that
sliding left performs better than “left+tap” combination in the portrait mode. Our single
sliding gesture type modules also perform well in the two modes, since most of them are
close to the top-left corner. Among the 16 modules, the classification modules for portrait
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and landscape sliding down gestures have the worst performance while the modules for
sliding left gestures have the best performance. A possible explanation to this result is
that people usually slide left for more contents while they are reading and they usually
hold the contents, sliding slowly. In most cases, people slide down to get back to the
top without reading. So they slide quick and slight. For a slow and “holding” sliding, the
screen can sense more personally specific information, which leads to a better classification
performance.
2.6.2.5 System Overhead
As shown previously, our system needs as less as 14 same type slidings to construct a fea-
ture vector. The following table (Tab. 2.4) shows the average time interval for each gesture
type according to our collected user data. For example, on average, a sliding up gesture
happens every 8.24 seconds in portrait mode. Therefore, our system can collect 14 portrait
sliding up gestures in 115.6 seconds, which means the system can usually re-authenticate
a user in 2 minutes using sliding up gestures. Learning an owner’s patterns is deployed on
Table 2.4: Average Time Interval for Gesture Types (Second)
up down left right tap
portrait 8.24 14.25 37.13 22.47 14.12
landscape 12.14 19.23 50.74 34.27 18.73
a PC in our architecture and performed offline. Feature extraction and classification is per-
formed online by a smartphone, which directly affects the user experience of our system.
Given a feature vector, the classification can be done in a short time because our feature
vector is of small dimension. Particularly, given a combinatory feature with 13 feature
values in it, our implementation only needed 17 milliseconds to give a prediction. The
implementation used LIBSVM [26] on a Motorola Droid phone.
Feature extraction contains filtering necessary gestures and calculating each feature
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values, and thus takes more time. We tested our feature extraction scheme on a Motorola
Droid smartphone with a single 550MHz A8 CPU, 256MB memory, 16GB sdcard, and
Android 2.2 OS. We fed 386, 701, 902, 1207, 1377, 1427, 1454, 1701, 2313, 3716, and
3943 gestures to the preprocessing and the feature extraction modules on the smartphone.
The running time and the number of filtered features are shown in Figure 2.13.
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Figure 2.13: Running Time of Feature Extraction
In practice, gestures will be fed to our monitoring component immediately after
they are captured by the screen. In some cases, the OS may buffer the gestures and suspend
our system for a while to run another high priority process. Since security is important in
many cases, we assume that our system is not suspended for a long time so that the number
of gestures it deals with at one time is within several hundreds. Looking at the second point
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in Figure 2.13, we can see that filtering 427 needed gestures from 701 gestures and extract-
ing features from them takes only 648 milliseconds. We note that this process was carried
out on a low-end smartphone and we can expect a dramatic performance enhancement on
current main-stream smartphones.
2.6.2.6 Discussion
We carried out all our data collections and experiments on Motorola Droid phones, which
are equipped with low-end touch screens. Therefore, some metrics may be dropped due
to the smartphone’s hardware limitations. For example, we left out the pressure related
metrics because the touch screen did not provide accurate pressure measurements. The
metrics may need to be carefully tested or even re-designed before deploying our system on
another smartphone platform. For example, pressure may become useful and provide more
user information on some smartphone platforms. However, our work provides a guideline
for the metric design on other platforms and our methodology can still be adopted. Our
work shows that using gestures to construct an unobservable continuous re-authentication
on smartphones is practical and promising.
2.7 Conclusions
In order to prevent unauthorized usage, we have proposed a re-authentication sys-
tem using user finger movement. The system performs continuous re-authentication and
does not need human assistance during re-authentication. We have discussed biometric
feature design and selection for finger movement. We have demonstrated the effectiveness
and efficiency of our system in extensive experiments. This work has been published in
[65].
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Part II
NEAR FIELD AUTHENTICATION
55
CHAPTER 3
Finger Movement Based Near Field Authentication
This work is motivated by a common scenario of using smart devices, such as smartphones
or tablets. Two people, say Alice and Bob, carry their smart devices and meet each other in
a cafeteria. Alice is going to transfer some of their photos to Bob via the free cafeteria wifi.
However, they want to do the transmission confidentially because the photos are private
to them. Over the insecure public cafeteria wifi, Alice and Bob need to set up a one-time
cryptographic session key to protect their communications, i.e. the photo transmission. In
order to agree on a one-time session key, they should first invoke some key exchange (KE)
protocol, such as Diffie-Hellman KE protocol. Without proper authentication, such a KE
protocol is usually vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Since Alice and Bob
are meeting in person, they can carry out the KE protocol using a near field communication
(NFC) system to defend against MITM attacks. An NFC system can only work within a
distance less than a few centimeters. An MITM attacker is difficult to attack the communi-
cation carried out by an NFC system. However, current NFC systems rely on NFC chips,
which are not available on many smart devices. In fact, only 20% of the smartphones on
the market are expected to be equipped with a NFC chip by the end of 2014 [60].
The goal of this work is to design a system that is not dependent on NFC chips but
able to authenticate whether two devices are in the near field via a insecure public network.
56
We call this kind of authentication near field authentication (NFA). The purpose of a near
field authentication system is different from that of a traditional authentication system. Tra-
ditional authentication systems usually authenticate either the authenticatee’s identity [62]
or his ownership of certain secret information, such as passwords or cryptographic keys.
NFA systems aim to verify whether the authenticatee, i.e. a smart device, appears in the
near field. Traditional authentication systems usually leverage the information that exists
or has been distributed prior to the authentication process. In contrast, an NFA process
usually takes place impromptu, which requires an NFA system to bootstrap authentication
from scratch.
With the widespread usage of smart devices, we will see a large number of near
field applications. One example is pay-with-smartphones, which is currently one of the
hottest applications on smartphone platforms. People store their credit card information in
smartphones and make purchases by putting their smartphones close to a reader. Since the
process is done in the near field, it is believed that the purchase is made by the smartphone
owner himself. This idea has been realized by Google Inc. as Google Wallet on Android
2.3.3 or later using NFC chips. Another example is that users can store their flight tickets in
their smart devices. When they check in at an airport, they just put the smart devices close
to a machine that reads the ticket information and processes check-in automatically. Again,
this application is only supported by devices having NFC chips. NFA plays a significant
and fundamental role in these applications, because it provides authenticated and confi-
dential communications between two devices. Therefore, in order to promote near field
applications and let more smart devices benefit from this new technique, it is necessary to
have a system that performs NFA on smart devices which do not have NFC chips.
The basic idea of a near field authentication is to compel two smart devices to
appear together and stay close when the authentication is carried out. Many previous works
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[1, 72, 96] have given initial solutions to this problem. BUMP™[1] is a representative
system among these works. The purpose of BUMP is to provide a fast way to match
two smartphones and then set up a secure data transmission channel. Their construction,
according to [96], is first to bump two smartphones, then use the accelerometer in each
smartphone to sense the force of the bump, and send the sensed results to a trusted server.
The server compares every incoming data, matches the two smartphones, produces and
sends the same session key to both if a match is found. However, using a centralized trusted
center may not be suitable for our scenario, due to the single point of failure and the fact that
Internet access may not always be available. For example, some tablets do not have cellular
data services and cannot have access to the Internet in places that do not provide public
Internet connections. Therefore, it is preferable to perform NFA over local networks, such
as bluetooth or wireless LAN. Mayrhofer and Gellersen [72] proposed two authentication
protocols with the purpose of pairing two devices. They used the accelerometer data that
is sensed during the shake motion to create a session key for smart devices. In order to
shake the devices for a few seconds, the device user needs to hold the two devices tightly
in one hand. This limits their protocol application to the small size devices. Large or fixed
devices, such as tablets and self-service check-in machines, cannot use their construction.
The idea of our near field authentication system is inspired by the observation that
touch screens now are widely equipped by smart devices. Therefore, we propose to use
people’s on-screen finger movements to construct a near field authentication system. In
order to force two smart devices to stay close to each other, we let a person move two
fingers of one hand — usually the index finger and the middle finger — simultaneously on
the two smart device screens, as illustrated in Fig. 3.1. The reason we use this motion is
that it is easy and natural for people to perform and it produces many variations in terms of
the sensed data. The more variations the data has, the more difficult it is for an attacker to
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Figure 3.1: Zigzagging Finger Movements on Two Smart Device Screens
carry out a dictionary attack. Since the two finger movements are done by one hand, they
are highly coherent to each other. We leverage this coherence to generate the session key
for the two smart devices.
It is natural to assume that the zigzag on-screen finger movements cannot produce
enough variations to fully defend against dictionary attacks. In other words, we believe
that a particular person’s finger movements may follow some pattern that can be used by
an attacker to construct a dictionary to enhance the probability of successfully guessing the
final session key. When data does not contain many variations, we say it is of low entropy.
The low entropy of finger movement data gives rise to the first challenge for our system
design. The second challenge is to find out which feature is suitable for finger movements
so that the extracted data is robust to the small differences between two finger movements.
Finally, even when the feature is robust, it is usually impossible to get two extracted data
exactly the same. Therefore, a reconciliation approach between two smart devices is needed
to make them agree on the same data. We make the following contributions in this study.
• We propose to use zigzag on-screen finger movements to perform near field authen-
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tication between two smart devices. Compared with the previous motion patterns,
such as bump, shake, etc., finger movements are easier to carry out and provides
better user experience. Another advantage is that finger movements are small and
hard-to-catch motions. The movements are hard to be observed and emulated by a
nearby attacker, which is a possible attack to the bump system [96].
• We design a robust feature so that two extracted feature data sets are similar to each
other. Zigzagging finger movements provide many features, such as curvature, cur-
vature distance, moving time, etc. We propose to use the time between the starting
point and a peak point as the feature to be extracted in our system. The reason behind
this choice is that people’s finger usually moves slowly, or makes a short-time pause,
when it turns at a curve peak point. Although the time is too short to be noticed by
human eyes, it is long enough to be sensed by the touch screens. This makes the
elapsed time of two corresponding peak points very similar to each other.
• We propose an efficient system to remove the differences between two extracted fea-
ture data sets and generate a high-entropy cryptographic key. We design an efficient
approach using a private set intersection protocol to reconciliate the two feature data
sets. As pointed out previously, the feature data is of low entropy. We use the en-
crypted key exchange technique to defend against dictionary attacks and generate a
high-entropy key.
• Our system is efficient. The efficiency of our system is twofold: 1) it is easy and
intuitive for people to use. 2) the computation overhead of our system is not heavy,
which is demonstrated in our evaluation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce related works in
Section 3.1. We formulate the NFA problem and discuss the design goals in Section 3.2.
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We present the design and constructions in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. We analyze
the system in Section 3.5 and present the experiment results in Section 3.6. We conclude
our work in Section 3.7.
3.1 Related Work
An NFA system is a kind of location limited system, but it puts more strict require-
ments on distance. In other words, when an NFA is passed, the two devices should be less
than a few centimeters apart, i.e. they are in near field.
The importance of location enforcement in authentication was first realized by Sta-
jano and Anderson in [94], in which users need to use a wired connection to complete
the authentication process between two devices. Motivated by this work, Balfanz et al.
[9] proposed the concept of location-limited channel, over which users carry out the au-
thentication process. The transmission range of the channel in their work could be from
centimeters to meters. However, the purpose of our work is to authenticate a device appear-
ing in a distance less than a few centimeters. In addition, the authors of [9] used infrared as
their location-limited channel, which is not available on most smart devices. The work of
McCune et al. [73] and the follow up work of Saxena and Watt [88] used the smartphone’s
camera to scan the barcode displayed on the other screen or film a blinking light toward
the other. Their protocols are directional, so a user has to execute the protocols twice to
achieve mutual authentication, which can be done by our system in one execution. Clay-
comb and Shin [29] proposed to use audio transmission as a location limited channel and
provide the key verification information through the audio channel to establish a secure
channel between two smartphones.
Many other prior works used various sensors on smartphones to achieve location
enforcement. The commercial app BUMP [1] uses the accelerometer to quickly match two
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smartphones for data transmission. As we introduced previously, BUMP system compares
the data measured during a bump between two intended devices to match the two devices
and provide confidential communications. The app is intuitive to use and needs less human
involvement. Their system security and efficiency rely on the BUMP server, modeled as a
trusted center. However, the server itself may suffer from single-point-of-failure problem
[68]. For our scenario, the trusted center scheme is not a suitable choice either, because the
Internet accessibility is not always available when people want to perform authentication
on smart devices. Some works [25, 46, 52, 72, 96] proposed to use a different motion
pattern — shake by a person — so as to achieve location enforcement. The accelerometer
sensor was used to sense the motion once again. Mayrhofer and Gellersen [72] used a
signal processing approach to remove the differences between sensed data sets and a key
exchange protocol to generate a session key. The protocols in [72] do not need a trusted
center. Although shake may provide the sensed data with more variations, it is difficult to
hold and shake a big smart device, such as a tablet. Some other works proposed to use
vibrations to transmit secret [45, 88]. The authors used the vibration that is produced by
one device to encode the secret and the accelerometer of the other to sense and decode the
secret. Recently, Studer et al. [96] proposed an MITM attack against those motion based
approaches. They assumed that there is a powerful adversary who can observe the user’s
motion, such as shake or bump, so that he can emulate a similar motion pattern to carry out
an MITM attack. While the success rate of their attack was sensitive to the delay induced
by the attacker, their work did suggest that a smaller motion pattern is preferred than shake
and bump when a third person is standing nearby.
In order to defend against MITM attacks, some prior studies suggested to use human
comparison after the secret exchange, because an attacker cannot change the output on
the device screen. Many works studied the comparison of a string or hexadecimal digits
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[18, 59, 100]. To improve the usability, other works proposed to encode hexadecimal digits
into a sentence [40] or an image [81]. However, string comparisons or picture comparisons
require human intelligence and are error prone for people. Compared with these works, our
system does not need manual comparison and is easy for people to use.
Establishing secure channels for two mobile devices without any pre-shared secret
information has been widely studied in recent years. Usually, such a system needs an out-
of-band (OOB) channel to transmit some secret information. While some applications seek
to migrate or remove such an OOB channel, by using BAN logic, Claycomb and Shin [28]
have shown that device authentication using a single channel is impossible.
3.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the near field authentication problem.
3.2.1 System Model
The purpose of a near field authentication system is stated in the following definition.
Definition 1. A near field authentication (NFA) system is a mutual authentication system
between two parties. When the authentication is successfully passed, the system convinces
both parties that they are separated in a distance less than a few centimeters. In addition,
at the end of a successful authentication, an NFA system assigns the same cryptographic
session key to both parties.
The parties considered in this work are smart devices equipped with touch screens,
such as smartphones, tablets, etc. For convenience, we use Alice and Bob (two human
names) to denote these two parties, which are actually two devices.
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An NFA system usually needs an approach to achieve location enforcement, forcing
two devices to stay close. Some systems use the physical limit of special communication
channels, such as NFC channels. Many other systems ask a person, called conductor in this
paper, to achieve the enforcement. The conductor is one of the device owners and assumed
to be trusted in this paper. This is a reasonable assumption because two persons who are
willing to do confidential communications must trust each other in our scenario. BUMP
system [1] lets a conductor use one smartphone to hit the other one to ensure that the two
devices are both in the vision of the conductor. Our construction asks a conductor to slide
two fingers of one hand over the two screens to achieve location enforcement.
3.2.2 Attack Model
The two smart devices involved in the authentication, including their executing applica-
tions, are considered trusted and not compromised. A near field authentication usually
takes place in the presence of device owners. They will not perform the authentication
process if they do not trust each other. Safeguarding a smart device against being compro-
mised by an outside attacker has been well studied in the area of intrusion detection and is
out of the scope of this work.
In this paper, we consider a fully malicious adversary, who controls public commu-
nication channels. The adversary is able to eavesdrop any communication. He is also able
to tamper, delay, replay, inject and block any message. During a protocol execution, the
adversary can carry out an MITM attack, impersonating one party to communicate with the
other honest one. Such a powerful adversary is always able to destroy an ongoing authenti-
cation process by blocking all messages. However, such a rash attack exposes the presence
of the adversary and does not bring back much benefit to the adversary. Observing the
presence of an adversary in NFA, the device owners can stop further communications and
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move to a more secure place. The main purpose of an NFA system is to protect follow
up communications, which are of more interest to the adversary. Therefore, the purpose
of the adversary in this work is to obtain the session key generated by an NFA system
without being captured, so that he can decrypt and obtain the succeeding communication
messages.
3.2.3 Design Goals
In addition to defending against the adversary modeled in Sec. 3.2.2, we expect an NFA
system to achieve the following design goals.
• It needs less human involvement. System users prefer to do simple and intuitive tasks.
An NFA System will not be widely accepted, if it needs people to do more involved
works, such as string comparisons.
• It is intuitive to use. A system should be designed in a way that is intuitive and easy
for people to learn how to use.
• It does not rely on prior knowledge. Near field authentication and follow up commu-
nications usually take place impromptu. Hence, the two involved parties cannot be
assumed to share any prior information.
• It is decentralized. An NFA is expected not to rely on any trusted center, which
suffers from a single-point-of-failure problem.
• It is localized. An NFA system should still work when the Internet is not accessi-
ble. For example, some companies limit the Internet access for safety reasons. In
such cases, an NFA system should make use of local networks, such as bluetooth
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or WLAN. This goal also makes the centralized architecture unsuitable for an NFA
system.
3.3 Design of An NFA System
3.3.1 System Overview
Fig. 3.2 shows the architecture of our NFA system. Our system uses human finger move-
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Figure 3.2: The Architecture of Our NFA System
ment on touch screens to assist authentication, taking advantage of the physical closeness
of two fingers to enforce the spatial closeness in NFA. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to use finger movement or touch screen input as a location limited channel.
Compared with other motion patterns, such as bump, shake, etc., finger movement has the
following merits.
• It provides more robust similarities.
• It is easy to carry out, especially on devices that are difficult to hold in one hand.
• It is hard to be observed and copied by a nearby attacker. Current studied motion
patterns, such as bumps and shakes, require a quite noticeable motion, which can be
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easily captured by a nearby attacker. Observing these motion patterns, an attacker
can launch a better dictionary attack, as described in [96].
In our system, when a conductor triggers an authentication process, the two devices
sense finger movements on their individual touch screens and extract the feature data lo-
cally. Using the extracted data, the two devices interact with each other to generate the
same session key. Finally, the two devices verify that the generated session keys are iden-
tical before they use them to protect succeeding communications.
3.3.2 Feature Design
Our system asks a conductor to use two fingers, from the same hand, to do a “zigzag”
movement on two touch screens (see Fig. 3.1). A zigzag movement forms a series of curves,
which provide many features to be extracted. The features of a curve have been studied by
Zheng et al. in [108] for mouse movement. They recommended to use angle of curvature,
curvature distance, and moving direction to characterize a curve movement. However, we
found, by experiments, that these spatial features are sensitive to finger movements. A
small deviation of two finger movements may cause a big difference between the resulting
feature values.
We propose to use a new temporal feature — the time between a peak point and the
starting point, i.e., the peak point’s elapsed time. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the starting point
is the point where a finger first touches the screen and peak points are the points where the
finger moving direction changes. The robustness of this feature is due to the fact that people
usually make a pause when their fingers turn above the screen. Although the pause usually
takes only about 0.04 second, it is long enough to be captured by a touch screen and can be
easily detected during a follow up data processing. Another observation is that two fingers
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may slide at slightly different speeds on two screens but they usually turn at the same time.
This makes peak point’s elapsed time a robust feature for an NFA system. A time value
collected by touch screen is accurate to 10−6 second, but such a high accuracy also causes
high sensitivity and low robustness. Hence, we round a time value to the nearest decimal
fraction with 2-digit fractional part. Finally, we drop off the decimal separator to make the
value an integer. For example, given a time value of 1.426478, we use 143 as a feature
value. Hereafter, we mean the processed time value when we say “time value”.
3.3.2.1 Variations
A feature with more variations is more difficult to be guessed by attackers. The variations
of our feature can be reflected by the distribution of time intervals between each pair of con-
tiguous peak points. Fig. 3.3 shows the histogram of the time intervals in a person’s zigzag
finger movement on one screen. The top-right sub-plot shows a “zoom-in” histogram of
0 8 16 24 32 40 48
0
5
10
15
20
25
time between peaks
0 20 40 60 80 100 130
0
10
20
30
40
50
Ti e betwe n two peaks
Figure 3.3: Features From One Person
the time intervals between 0 and 50. We note that the bin width is different in the zoom-in
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histogram. The bin width in the big plot is 5 units and the one in the zoom-in plot is 2 units.
The data collection was carried out on two Motorola Droid smartphones running Android
2.2 OS. From the figure, we can see that the time intervals distribute from less than 0.1 sec-
ond (10×10−2) to around 1.4 seconds. This shows that the variation of a person’s feature
value is large. We can also see that many values congregate into the interval between 10
and 25. The sub-plot shows that the values distribute almost evenly on each bin between 8
and 24. This shows that this person’s finger movement has some pattern: the time that he
uses between two peak points is mostly between 0.08 and 0.24 second.
3.3.2.2 Similarity
Feature values collected from two devices are expected to be very similar to each other,
because it saves the time of removing the differences between two sensed feature data sets
in the feature reconciliation phase. A person was invited to slide fingers zigzag on two
devices, which recorded two sequences of peak points, respectively. We call a peak point
in one sequence and its counterpart in the other a pair. We computed every peak point’s
elapsed time. Finally, we calculated the absolute difference between the two elapsed time
values in each pair. A set of such absolute difference values can be viewed as a measure-
ment of the similarity between the two sensed feature data sets. The distribution of the
absolute differences is shown in Fig. 3.4. The experiments represented by the yellow bars
were carried out on two Motorola Droid smartphones, while the experiments represented
by the green bars were carried out on two different smart devices — a Motorola Droid
smartphone and an HP TouchPad™tablet. For comparison purpose, we also calculated the
difference sets, as done previously, for another two spatial features, curvature angle and
curvature distance, proposed by and defined in [108]. Due to space limitation, we refer
readers to [108] for details. We can see that most differences between two corresponding
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Figure 3.4: Similarity of Our Designed Feature
elapsed time values are less than 3, indicating that the two feature data sets are very similar.
Specifically, 82.97% of all absolute differences obtained from the experiments on the same
device type (yellow bars) are less than 3. This percentage is 74.73% on the different device
types (green bars). At the same time, most absolute differences of another two feature sets
are greater than 3 and many of them are greater than 20.
3.4 System Construction
We are now ready to present the construction of our system in details. Our system
consists of a conductor and two smart devices. In the following description, one device
is denoted by Alice and the other is denoted by Bob. There is no difference between
these two roles, because our authentication is mutual. In our motivating case, the data
sender is Alice and the data receiver is Bob. We assume that Alice and Bob are able to set
up a communication connection through a local network, such as wifi LAN or bluetooth
network. This connection is public and insecure. Our system helps Alice and Bob to
authenticate each other in near field and establishes a secure connection by assigning each
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of them the same session key.
We say the two smart devices are ready, when our NFA system is launched on
both devices and a communication connection has been launched between them. The two
devices then stay monitoring the screen touch and waiting for the conductor’s finger move-
ments.
Our system consists of three phases: system setup and feature reconciliation, key
generation, and key confirmation. Figure 3.5 shows the system setup and feature reconcil-
iation phase. In this phase, we use two hash functions: H1 : {0,1}∗→ G and H2 : G2→
{0,1}l , where l is determined by the security level. Here G is a multiplicative group of
a prime order. Hash function H2 takes two group elements and outputs an output of fixed
length. In practice, H2 can be constructed from any cryptographic hash function H ′, which
takes an input (of arbitrary length) and hashes to a fixed length output. For example, SHA-
1 is such a hash function, if the security level is less than 128 [11]. To construct H2, we
concatenate the two inputs together and pass into H ′. Construction of H1 is special, since
it hashes the input to a group G, not a fixed length output. It is constructed from a cryp-
tographic hash function H ′′ : {0,1}∗→ {0,1}l1 , where l1 = logq and q is the group order.
The idea is to hash the input to an element h in Zq and the output of H1 is gh, where g
is a generator of G. However, an output of H ′′ may exceed the range of Zq. A standard
technique is to re-hash H ′′(x||1) and verify whether the new output is in Zq. Repeat for k
times (H ′′(x||k) for k-th re-hashing) till the output is accepted. Since the probability that
an output exceeds Zq is less than 1/2, the failure probability decreases exponentially with
the repeat times. For example, we get an overall failure probability less than 0.1% if we
choose k = 10.
Feature reconciliation is to remove differences between Alice’s and Bob’s sensed
data sets. First, Alice and Bob choose m pairs of elapsed time values. Since the difference
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When the two devices are ready, a conductor puts the two smart devices side by side,
slides his two fingers of one hand zigzag on the two screens, and then triggers the
authentication process. The two smart devices, Alice and Bob, sense and calculate two
elapsed time setsA = {a1,a2, · · · ,an} andB = {b1,b2, · · · ,bn}, respectively. Here, n
is the number of peak points.
Feature Reconciliation
1. Given a security level κ , Alice generates a cyclic group G of prime order q,
written in a multiplicative notation, and sends it to Bob. Alice randomly selects
m elements at1,at2, · · · ,atm and sends t1, t2, · · · , tm to Bob.
2. For every ti, 1≤ i≤m, Bob selects αi←R Zq, calculates hi =H1(bti),yi = (hi)αi ,
and finally sends yi’s to Alice.
3. Alice selects a random number k←R Zq. For every yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, Alice calcu-
lates zi = (yi)k. Alice prepares a non-interactive zero knowledge proof pi for the
knowledge of k s.t. ∀i=1,··· ,m zi = (yi)k. Alice sends zi’s to Bob along with proof
pi .
4. Bob aborts if pi is not verified. Bob calculates xi =H2(hi,(zi)1/αi) for 1≤ i≤m.
LetX = {x1, · · · ,xm}.
5. Alice extends {at1,at2, · · · ,atm} to set A ′ = {ati+ 3,ati+ 2,ati+ 1,ati,ati−
1,ati− 2,ati− 3}1≤i≤m. For each element a′j in the set, Alice calculates u j =
H2(H1(a′j),(H1(a′j))k). Alice randomly permutes all u j’s and sends the final set
U to Bob.
6. Bob calculates set Vb = {bti| (1≤ i≤ m)∧ (xi ∈U ∩X )}. If |V |< 4 and it is
their first execution, Bob informs Alice and they re-execute step 1-6. If |V |< 4
and it is their second execution, this authentication fails; Bob informs the con-
ductor the failure reason and asks the conductor to start over the authentication.
Otherwise, Bob sends set Vx = {xi|bti ∈ Vb} to Alice. By comparing Vx against
U , Alice also learns set Vb.
Alice and Bob now have the same data set Vb. Alice (Bob) sorts the elements in the non
decreasing order, represents them in binary strings, and concatenates them together in
a string, which is denoted by w hereafter.
Figure 3.5: System Setup and Feature Reconciliation
between the two values in most pairs is less than 3, we let Alice extend her selected set by
including a±1, a±2,a±3 for every a in the set (step 5). Then, Alice and Bob privately
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find the set intersection. We use a private set intersection protocol proposed by [51] to let
both parties find the same intersection set Vb (step 6). To get enough randomness, we need
at least 4 feature values since each value can provide nearly 6 bits. If the found set size is
too small, we simply let Alice and Bob redo the reconciliation phase. If they still cannot
find enough values, this authentication fails and we let the conductor start over the whole
authentication again.
In step 3 of the first phase, Alice needs to generate a non-interactive zero knowl-
edge proof pi of knowledge of k s.t. ∀i=1,··· ,mzi = (yi)k. Although general zero-knowledge
proof systems are currently thought to be inefficient, the zero knowledge proof system on
discrete logarithm has been well studied and there exists an efficient non-interactive proof
system [8]. Alice randomly chooses t ←R Zq and calculates c = H(z1|| · · · ||zm||y1|| · · ·
||ym||yt1|| · · · ||ytm) and s = (t− ck) mod q, where H is a cryptographic hash function. The
proof pi is tuple<c,s,z1, · · · ,zm,y1, · · · ,ym>. To verify the proof, Bob checks c=H(z1|| · · ·
||zm||y1|| · · · ||ym||ys1zc1|| · · · ||ysmzcm).
Key Generation.
1. Alice randomly picks one generator g, two elements M, N from G and sends
them to Bob. Alice randomly picks r←R Zq, calculates R= gr, R′ = R ·Mw, and
sends R′ to Bob.
2. Bob randomly picks s←R Zq, calculates S = gs, S′ = S ·Nw, and sends S′ to
Alice.
3. Alice calculates the session key as skA = H3(R′,S′,KA), where KA = (S′/Nw)r.
Bob calculates the session key as skB = H3(R′,S′,KB), where KB = (R′/Mw)s.
Figure 3.6: Key Generation
When the same intersection set is obtained by both parties, the binary strings of
its elements are concatenated together in a string w. Since w may be of low entropy, we
propose to use encrypted key exchange approach [5] to leave attackers no choice but doing
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online dictionary attacks, which are easily captured by honest parties. It is a variation of
the original Deffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [95]. The improvement is for defending
against MITM attacks, which can break down the original DH protocol. In the protocol,
a session key is the hash of all the previous messages and the secret string KA or KB. In
this way, an MITM attack will be effectively defended because two honest parties obtain
different messages in an MITM attack. Also, an offline dictionary attack becomes hard
because all the intermediate messages are randomized and the final session key is also
randomly selected through the hash function.
Key Confirmation.
1. Alice generates a nonce c and sends CA = EncskA(c) to Bob. Bob generates a
nonce d and sends CB = EncskB(d) to Alice.
2. Upon receiving CA from Alice, Bob decrypts it under key skB, obtains c′, in-
creases it by one, re-encrypts the result C ′A = EncskB(c
′+ 1), and sends the ci-
phertext back to Alice. Similarly, Alice sends a ciphertext C ′B back to Bob.
3. Upon receivingC ′A, Alice decrypts it, obtains c
′′, and passes the key confirmation
if c′′ = c+1. Similarly, Bob checks whether d′′ = d+1.
Figure 3.7: Key Confirmation
Fig. 3.7 shows the construction of the key confirmation phase of our NFA system.
Here, we use another hash function H3 :G3→ {0,1}l . The construction of H3 is the same
as that of H2. This phase is to let two parties explicitly confirm that the generated keys are
same. We note that a nonce is a random number, the length of which is determined by the
security level. For example, if the security level is 80 bit, we will choose a 80-bit random
number. In some upper protocols, such as confidential instant message protocols, this phase
is not necessary and the confirmation can be done in a implicit way. Bob sends Alice a hello
message that is encrypted using his session key. If Alice decrypts the ciphertext and finds
the plain text is of no meaning, she will be aware that they must have different session
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keys. However, this phase becomes necessary for those applications whose goal is solely
to perform a near field authentication.
3.5 System Analysis
3.5.1 Performance Analysis
Our NFA system is a probabilistic algorithm because it is based on users’ biologic data and
may encounter some outliers. Although our design can remove some small differences,
our system may still fail when most selected data are very different from its counterpart.
Given a pair of peak points, if their value difference is no more than 3, we call them a valid
pair. We have shown in Sec. 3.3.2.2 that it is with high probability to select a valid pair.
Particularly, more than 70% pairs in our experiments are valid. The failure probability of
our system is also affected by the number of the selected elements, m. Generally speaking,
the more elements we select, the more probably we can find enough elements.
Theorem 1. The feature reconciliation phase finishes successfully with a high probability,
if m≥ 7 and the proportion of valid pairs is more than 70%.
Proof. Because the pairs are randomly selected, testing the validity of a selected pair is a
Bernoulli trial with success probability p. Therefore, the probability that 4 out of m pairs
are valid is
P = 1−
3
∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
(1− p)m−k pk
Plug in m = 7 and p = 70%, we obtain P = 87.40%. If the first attempt fails, the phase lets
two parties redo the reconciliation using another set of randomly selected pairs. Therefore,
the overall success probability of the feature reconciliation phase is P+(1−P)P= 98.4%.
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Our system is based on a conductor’s zigzag finger movement and thus does not
need any prior knowledge. The conductor only needs to slide fingers and trigger the au-
thentication process. Therefore, our system is intuitive for people to use and does not need
any involved human assistance, such as comparing two strings. Our system is fully de-
centralized and all computations are done between two devices. It does not need any third
trusted center or server.
The feature reconciliation phase performs O(m logq) group multiplications, where
q is group order. The key generation phase needs O(m logq) group multiplications. It is
spent on computing Mw and Nw because the length of w is O(m). The key confirmation is
done in constant time.
3.5.2 Security Analysis
Most security threats to an NFA system come from MITM attacks and dictionary attacks.
In the first phase, the private set intersection protocol guarantees that only a set provider can
learn the final intersection set and nothing beyond the intersection. In the second phase, if
an MITM adversary changes any intermediate message, Alice and Bob will derive different
session keys. This alerts both parties to the existence of an adversary. Further more, if the
adversary does not have the intersection set, he cannot get the keys derived by Alice and
Bob.
Someone may be concerned with replay attacks. If a conductor uses his finger
movements to generate the session key for a communication between his and an attacker’s
smart devices, the attacker may use the elapsed time set and carries out an MITM attack
when the conductor tries to generate another session key between his smartphone and a
third user’s. The success of such an attack is based on the assumption that the conductor’s
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finger movements in two sessions are very similar. However, this assumption can be easily
broken when the conductor intentionally does not use the same finger movement pattern.
For example, the conductor can randomly pause during the motion to break the pattern.
Or, we can compare the current elapsed time set against the previous ones and ask the
conductor to re-do the authentication and change the pattern if a similarity is found.
Mimicry attack is such an attack in which an attacker observes the conductor’s
finger movement in some way, such as video, and tries to guess the generated session key.
First, this attack has to be taken on the fly, because any off-line dictionary attack will be
defended by the password based authentication key exchange protocol (PAKE). Secondly,
the attacker has only one chance to carry out the attack, since any more attempt will be
noticed by the PAKE protocol. Besides, the elapsed time of the mocked finger movements
have to be as precise as 1 milliseconds. This limitation makes mimicry attacks extremely
difficult.
In the traditional private set intersection protocol, an adversary may impersonate
one party in the protocol and generate a set of all possible values so that he can infer the
honest party’s whole input set. However, the feature reconciliation phase restricts the set
size, m for Bob and 7m for Alice, to make it difficult for an adversary to enumerate all
possible values. Offline dictionary attacks to the key generation phase is also impossible
because r, s, M, and N are randomly selected. For an example, R′ can be viewed as an
encryption of message M using key w. Given R′ = R ·Mw, an adversary iterates every
possible key w to decrypt the ciphertext. However, since the message M itself is chosen
randomly and of no meaning, the adversary cannot verify the validity of the obtained plain
text. An adversary can carry out online dictionary attacks, guessing a w and interacting
with an honest party. But every failure will be captured by an honest party.
Our system uses two built-in blocks, a private set intersection protocol [51] for
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feature reconciliation phase (Fig. 3.5) and an encrypted key exchange protocol [5] for key
generation phase (Fig. 3.6). The two protocols have been proved to be secure against
a malicious adversary in random oracle model by [5] and [51], respectively. The random
oracle model is a security proving framework that assumes the existence of a random oracle
mapping each request value to a random value. This oracle can be accessed by all protocol
participants, including the adversary. The hash function is usually modeled as the random
oracle in the proof. Following the same idea, we will see that the feature reconciliation
phase and key generation phase of our system are secure. One thing we need to point
out is step 6, where we connect the two built-in blocks. Different from the protocol in
[51], we let Bob send back the hash values of the intersection set. If Bob is impersonated
by an adversary, our system gives him chance to maliciously change the returned values
such that Alice will obtain a intersection set different from his own one. We remark that
the adversary cannot arbitrarily manipulate the set intersection in the sense that he can
only remove elements or add new elements that he does not know (chosen from Alice’s
published hash values). While this breaks the fairness in private set intersection protocols,
we argue that it does not harm our system. It is because the intersection set itself is actually
of no interest to the adversary, whose goal is to get the final session key and the follow up
communication contents. If the adversary modifies the intersection set, he will definitely
obtain a session key different from Alice’s. Alice will then abort in the key confirmation
phase. Therefore, an adversary has no incentive to do such a modification.
3.6 Evaluations
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of our system. We made a proof-of-
concept implementation of our NFA system on Motorola Droid smartphones, which have
a 550MHz ARM A8 processor, 256MB memory, a 16GB SD card, and Android 2.2 OS.
78
This bland specification makes Droid a good representative of the low-end smart devices
in today’s market.
We first tested whether our feature reconciliation can finish successfully with a high
probability. In other words, out of m randomly selected pairs, is it of high probability that
two devices can find at least 4 valid pairs? To answer this question, we did 100 experiments
on two Droid smartphones and another 100 experiments on a Droid smartphone and a HP
TouchPad tablet. Each experiment collected at least 10 peak points. We tested the success
rate under different m values. Fig. 3.8 shows the proportion of the experiments in which
our system can finish successfully. From the figure, we can see that even if m is only 5, our
system can succeed with probability close to 80%. When m is increased to 7, data collected
from two Droid phones showed a success rate of 97.8% while the rate from two different
devices was 90% . When m is 10, the experiments on two different devices also showed a
very high success probability, 97%.
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In the feature reconciliation phase, we use a hash-into-group hashing function H1,
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which is constructed from a cryptographic hash function as introduced in Sec. 3.4. The
construction is a probabilistic algorithm. We tested the success rate of this hash function.
For test purpose, we hashed 1000 random numbers, from (0,200], into four different order
groups: 128, 160, 512, and 1024 bit groups. The first two group orders are popular selection
for the elliptic curve groups (ECC) and the last two are for the quadratic residue groups over
the Galois field modulo a safe prime, which is called DL groups in this section. 160-bit and
512-bit output were obtained by using SHA-1 and SHA-512. In order to obtain a 128-bit
output, we used SHA-1 and took the 128 least significant bits as output. To obtain 1024-bit
output, we divided the binary string of the input number into two halves, hashed each half
into a 512-bit string, and concatenated the both together. For each number, we recorded
how many attempts needed to hash the number into the desired group. Each experiment
tried 10 re-hashes before it reported “fail”. Fig. 3.9 shows the results. We can see that, in
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our experiments, to hash a number into the 128-bit 512-bit, and 1024-bit groups, we needed
to try no more than 4 times. For the 160-bit group, we needed to re-hash a small portion of
numbers for more than 5 times. We note that, in our experiments, all 1000 random numbers
were successfully hashed into the groups in 10 attempts.
For a smartphone protocol, the execution time is critical in the sense that smart-
phones usually have limited computational and storage resources. As pointed out previ-
ously, all our simulation were carried out on a low-end Motorola Droid smartphone. We
tested the running time of the zero-knowledge proof generating and verifying, the feature
reconciliation phase, and the key generation phase. We did not test the key confirmation
phase since it does not take up much proportion in the system execution time and actually
always costs the same time when the security parameter is determined. Our system was im-
plemented in two types of groups: a 1024-bit quadratic residue subgroup of a Galois field
modulo a safe prime p and a 160-bit elliptic curve group. According to NIST’s guidance
[78], the two groups both have 80-bit security level. The results are shown in Fig 3.10a,
3.10b, and 3.10c. We remark that the time of the feature reconciliation phase contains the
time of generating and verifying zero knowledge proof. We note that the y-axis in the fig-
ures are not continuous and we skipped in the middle because there was a big gap between
the execution time of the two implementations. To show the details of the time changing in
the plots, we stretched the y-axis and cut off the middle blank area. We executed the two
implementations under different m values introduced in step 1.
All the execution time increased linearly with the increase of m, since we have to
process larger sets in generating the proof and performing private set intersection. A larger
set also leads to higher probability of generating a long password w, which causes more
execution time in generating the session key. Another obvious observation is that the ECC
implementation was overwhelmingly faster than the DL implementation in zero knowledge
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Figure 3.10: Evaluation Results
proof, feature reconciliation, and key generation. For an example, if we set m= 18, the DL
implementation took almost 100 seconds to privately find a set intersection, while the ECC
implementation needed less than 7 seconds. The same performance difference was also
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observed when we perform zero knowledge proof and key generation. The difference is
due to the different group size used by the two implementations: the DL implementation
used a 1024-bit group and the ECC implementation used a 160-bit group. The reason for
the different order choice is that the security of a DL group is easier to be cracked when its
order is the same as an ECC group. For a larger group size, a basic group operation, such
as multiplication and exponentiation, costs more time. Therefore, it is not surprising to see
such a big gap between the two execution time values. We thus recommend to use ECC
group as the real implementation of our NFA system. In practice, m = 10 is sufficiently
large to select 4 pairs of valid peak points. In this case, the ECC implementation took
3.71 and 0.14 seconds to finish first phase and the second phase. Totally, the system can
terminate in less than 4 seconds for an authentication.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed a new concept, named near field authentication,
to help smart devices authenticate each other in a near field. We have designed a near
field authentication system which uses a novel and natural human motion, zigzag finger
movement, to enforce the spatial closeness. We have shown that the finger movement
have high variations and stable similarities. In order to remove the differences between
sensed feature data and generate high-entropy session key, we have proposed to use private
set intersection and encrypted key exchange in our system. Finally, we have simulated our
system on a real Android smartphone with a bland hardware specification and demonstrated
its efficiency. This work has been published in [63, 64].
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CHAPTER 4
Secure Acoustic Near Field Authentication
Many smartphone assisted security applications grant user services or privileges based on
the physical proximity between a smartphone and a terminal, e.g., a computer. Hence
proximity assertion is an important security mechanism. In this paper, we present a novel
near field assertion system that generates valid assertions only when the two devices are
within a few centimeters.
Our work is motivated by smartphone based two factor authentication (SBTFA),
which verifies both a user’s username/password and a pre-loaded secret in the user’s smart-
phone. During authentication, the smartphone’s proximity indicates that the operator is the
user himself. However, this indication is suspicious in the presence of relay attacks [55].
This type of attack utilizes two communicating devices, a leech and a ghost. The leech is
placed physically close to the smartphone and the ghost close to the terminal. The attacker
simply relays challenge and response messages between the terminal and the smartphone
via ghost-leech intercommunications and thus creates the illusion of physical proximity
between the two honest devices even if they are very far apart. Relay attacks void the secu-
rity protection provided by the smartphone. For example, a user is waiting at a coffee shop
counter with his smartphone in his pocket and leaves his laptop unattended on a table. Even
though the operating system on the laptop is protected by SBTFA, an attacker who can per-
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form relay attacks only needs the user’s password to crack into the system. Relay attacks
raise a greater threat against applications that use smartphones as the only authentication
factor [13, 22].
Relay attacks make SBTFA no securer than password only authentication. Even
worse, people may reduce their security vigilance due to the installation of a “securer”
protection. Many SBTFA system designers have realized the threat of relay attacks and
confined the system communications in a short range wireless network. However, recent
works have demonstrated positive feasibility studies for performing relay attacks in the
real world over short range wireless networks, including Bluetooth [61], RFID [36], and
NFC [37]. To prevent relay attacks and enforce proximity communications, researchers
have developed two main techniques. One is distance bounding protocol [19] that crypto-
graphically bounds the inter-device distance by measuring the response time. The other is
contextual co-presence approach [44, 69, 89] that enforces the proximity by comparing the
ambient information (e.g., GPS, temperature, etc.) sensed by the two co-present devices.
However, the distance bounding protocol is difficult to adopt on main-stream devices. The
contextual co-presence approach can only confine the two devices in a large area, such as
a coffee shop. A relay attack is still possible if the attacker also stays in the same area.
Therefore, there is a great demand for a system that can restrict devices in a small
area and fully resist relay attacks. However, relay attacks are due to an essential flaw of
existing communication system — there is an unpredictable wait between a message and
its response. This makes relay attacks very challenging to defend against.
In this paper, we present a surprisingly simple solution to this problem. The main
idea is illustrated in Figure 4.1: if two people communicate by whispering, it is hard for a
third person at a distance to hear the conversation.
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Figure 4.1: Whisper Restricts Communication Distance
While the main idea is easy to understand, building a working system that can pre-
vent relay attacks is challenging. Our main contribution is a design and implementation
of such a system, named Dolphin. Dolphin generates near field assertions via acoustic
communications, manipulates the sound power to restrict the communication distance, and
uses full-duplex communication [50] to prevent relay attacks. In particular, Dolphin has
the following properties.
• It asserts whether two communicating devices are in the near field (a few centimeters)
of each other. We use the term “near field” instead of “proximity” to emphasize that
the asserted distance can be as small as a few centimeters. A device can prove that it
is in the near field by presenting the assertion to the other party.
• It can prevent relay attacks. Dolphin has an adjustable time window limiting an
attacker’s relay time. A prudent implementation leaves an attacker no time to relay
messages.
• It requires no extra equipments and can be easily deployed on off-the-shelf devices.
Dolphin is a fully automated system and needs no human interactions.
• A valid near field assertion generated by Dolphin is a binary sequence and confiden-
tial to the two devices that execute Dolphin. This property is important for appli-
cations that generate a cryptographic session key based on the devices’ proximity
relations, such as one-time file sharing between two proximate smartphones [3].
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• It is light-weight and battery friendly for smartphones.
Although Dolphin is designed to provide relay-resistant near field assertions, it also
has an interesting “by-product” — valid assertions are confidential to the two communicat-
ing devices. This property helps improve the security of applications that base their system
security solely on the physical proximity relations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we review prior
works on proximity assertions. We present our design goals and thereat model in Sec-
tion 4.2. In Section 4.3, we illustrate the key ideas used in Dolphin and present an overview
of the system. In Section 4.4, we present the details of the entire system. We present eval-
uations of Dolphin in Section 4.5, and conclude the paper in Section 4.6.
4.1 Related Works
The problem of restricting the distance between two communicating devices has been stud-
ied in pairing systems [29] and relay resistant systems [98].
One promising approach is to transmit data over an out-of-band (OOB) channel and
use the channel’s physical properties to restrict the distance. Stajano and Anderson [93]
proposed to use a physical cable. Balfanz et al. [10] used infrared light to restrict distance.
Near field communication (NFC) technique can be employed to construct a near field as-
sertion system. However, these approaches require an additional equipment (e.g., a cable
or an NFC chip), which may not be available when an assertion is needed. It is preferable
to have a system that requires no extra equipments and can be executed on most off-the-shelf
devices.
A few works took advantage of visual OOB channel [73, 87]. McCune et al. pro-
posed SiB [73] that displays a barcode on one screen and “reads” it using another device.
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Saxena et al. [87] proposed to let the devices encode and transmit data via blinking LED.
Other works explored user’s motions [1, 25, 72, 96] and used the sensed force during mo-
tion to restrict the communication distance. BUMP [1] uses the bump force during a bump
between two devices. Shaking two devices together has been widely used in many works
[25, 72, 96]. Some works let a user manually compare the information displayed on the two
device screens [59, 81, 100]. However, most of these approaches are not automated and
require extensive user involvement. Such approaches become unsuitable when assertions
are frequently needed.
Recently, Nandakumar et al. [77] achieved confidential data transmission over
acoustic channels in the near field. They used low signal power and signal interference
to protect the data. However, their system is not designed for distance restriction and is
vulnerable to relay attacks.
Distance bounding protocols [19] cryptographically restrict the distance of two
communicating devices: a verifier sends a series of rapid-fire challenges and requires a
prover to respond immediately. The round-trip time of an interaction is measured and used
to estimate the distance. The distance bounding protocol is provably secure but requires a
no-latency communication channel and complicated implementations. The inconveniences
impede this approach’s industry adoption. Therefore, a desired approach should be easily
deployed and adopted.
Alternatively, contextual co-presence is a widely-adopted approach which lets two
devices sense and compare the ambient information to make a proximity assertion. Various
systems have been proposed using different information, including GPS raw data [69],
WiFi signal strength and access point address [58], ambient acoustic finger print [44, 89],
cell broadcast information [38], and user’s sitting posture [13]. Usage of a combination of
multiple environment information has been studied in [90, 98]. Although such approaches
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restrict two devices in the same area, the restricted distance cannot be at the accuracy of
a few centimeters. In addition, keeping sensors awake for a long time drains smartphone
battery. It is necessary to design a system that restricts distance in the near field and is
battery friendly.
4.2 Design Goals and Threat Model
4.2.1 Design Goals
The main objective of Dolphin is to generate valid assertions only when the two devices
are in the near field. We do not include any identity authentication in the system and leave
the usage of generated assertions to application developers. The design goals of a desired
system are outlined below.
• Functionality: the system asserts whether two devices are in the near field and out-
puts an assertion to each device. The two assertions are identical if the devices are in
the near field, but different otherwise.
• Credibility: when the resulting assertions are identical, the two devices are in the
near field. Attackers cannot force two devices to generate the same assertion if they
are not in the near field. The attacks include but are not limited to relay attacks. For
example, if a system is based on sensing ambient sound, a sophisticated attacker can
break credibility by playing the same music loudly and close to the two devices.
• Confidentiality: valid assertions are not known to any other party other than the two
communicating ones. This is useful in security applications that create a session key
based on the devices’ proximity relations. The resulting, confidential assertions can
be used as a shared secret and to derive a session key.
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• Usability: 1) a fully automated or zero-interaction system is preferable; 2) the system
should need no extra equipments and be compatible with most off-the-shelf devices;
3) the system should be easy to develop and adopt.
• Sustainability: the system should not drain smartphone battery fast.
4.2.2 Threat Model
Dolphin consists of a terminal, a smartphone, and a local network connection between
them. A terminal is not necessarily a big-size machine and could be a smartphone or
a tablet. The two devices are both honest. The connection is assumed to be insecure and
controlled by the attackers. We do not consider jamming or DDoS attackers, whose purpose
is to destroy the communications and assertion generation.
Dolphin may be used in two scenarios, assertion only and authentication, and can
cope with different attackers.
Assertion Only is a scenario where the two devices only want to make a near field
assertion. The parties care about the functionality and credibility rather than the confi-
dentiality of the assertions. SBTFA [32] fits this scenario. In this scenario, we assume
the terminal and the smartphone have their own signing-verification key pairs and have
exchanged the verification keys. Also, the two devices have each other’s public key for
encryption purpose. Dolphin allows attackers to eavesdrop the entire local network and to
manipulate any message. Attackers may carry out relay attacks between two devices that
are not in the near field.
Authentication is a scenario where two devices want to derive a session key from
valid assertions. This scenario requires that the resulting assertions are confidential. Pair-
ing [29] and secure near field file sharing [3] are two examples that fit this scenario. In this
90
scenario, Dolphin does not require the two devices to exchange any secret in advance. An
attacker controls the local network but stays outside the near field during the system exe-
cution. We assume that the attacker cannot perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
Relay attacks are different from MITM attacks in that an MITM attacker actively modi-
fies the relayed messages but a relay attacker does not. We argue that this assumption is
reasonable, because an MITM attack cannot be prevented without any trust base (e.g., a
pre-exchanged secret). In addition, this scenario usually happens with smartphone own-
ers’ attendance. Performing an MITM attack via acoustic communications in the near field
would arouse the owners’ suspicions. The owners can either exam and clear their environ-
ment before executing the system or manually compare the final assertions afterward, in a
human friendly way [34].
4.3 Key Ideas of DOLPHIN
Dolphin explores sound as an OOB channel, because the power of sound fades very fast
with the increase of transmission distance. A real life example is that when someone is
whispering, we can hear it clearly if we stand very close. If we step away from the speaker,
the voice becomes weaker and weaker and is finally buried in the ambient noise. Similarly,
the idea of Dolphin is to transmit acoustic signals with power equal to the ambient noise
power plus a small threshold. Using the threshold, Dolphin ensures that the signal cannot
be decoded beyond a desired distance. Another nice property of sound is that it requires no
special equipment, making Dolphin work on most off-the-shelf devices.
Relay resistance is a necessary but challenging part of Dolphin. Relay attacks are
due to the fact that a communicating party does not know how long it needs to wait for
the response message. Why is the waiting time unknown? The answer is that the com-
munications are half-duplex! After one party sends out its message, the other one does
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not respond until the message has been delivered by the network. The delivery could be
influenced by unpredictable network latency and attackers can take this chance to relay
messages, as illustrated in Figure 4.2a. To fully resist relay attacks, we propose to use full-
duplex communications. The two devices simultaneously transmit outgoing messages and
receive incoming messages. Dolphin has a time window of an adjustable size. Starting at
its message transmission, an honest party only accepts a message arriving within the time
window, as illustrated in Figure 4.2b. Therefore, a small time window makes relay attacks
impossible.
relay
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sending
msg
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response
valid
time
invalid
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Figure 4.2: Half-duplex vs. Full-duplex
While signal interference is what communication system designers usually want
to avoid, Dolphin explores signal interference to protect the confidentiality of transmitted
messages and the resulting assertions. Dolphin simultaneously transmits two message sig-
nals in a way that the interference between them makes it extremely difficult for an attacker
to separate and decode them. While it is difficult for an attacker to decode the two (com-
bined) messages, Dolphin uses self-interference cancellation to make the decoding possible
for the two parties involved.
Overview of Dolphin: A user places his smartphone close to a terminal and starts
Dolphin on both. Once started, Dolphin keeps running and generates assertions on demand.
If a device wants to make an assertion, it sends the other device a request message to
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trigger the following process. The two devices each choose a b-bit random binary sequence,
where b is a positive integer. A larger value for b incurs more communication overhead but
provides stronger security. In our implementation, we set b to 16. Both devices measure
the ambient noise, determine the transmission power, modulate the sequence to an acoustic
signal, and transmit their signals simultaneously. After the transmission completes, each
device cancels self signal interference, demodulates and obtains the binary sequence of
the other. Each device obtains a 2b-bit near field assertion by appending the smartphone’s
sequence to the terminal’s. Except the acoustic signal, all messages are transmitted over
the local network.
4.4 Design Details of DOLPHIN
For demonstration purpose, we implemented a prototype of Dolphin on an iPhone 5s and a
13-inch mid 2009 Macbook Pro over WiFi connections. We chose Apple platform for two
reasons: 1) it provides similar APIs for iOS and Mac OSX, accelerating the development;
2) iOS and Mac OSX have reputations in audio programming — providing low latency,
flexible APIs, and powerful native libraries. We emphasize that our framework and design
methodologies can be applied to any platform and need no special hardware support.
We first explain some terms that will be used in the paper. A signal is a sound
transmitting a message. Digitally, a signal is stored in a sequence of discrete samples, that
denote the signal amplitudes at a fixed sampling rate. A symbol is a group of consecutive
samples carrying one message bit. A signal contains a sequence of symbols. A tone is a
sine wave signal of small length.
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4.4.1 The Acoustic Channel
We start our designs by studying Dolphin’s OOB channel — the acoustic channel, which is
significantly interfered by the ambient noise. To characterize the interference, we measured
the ambient noise power at three typical places where Dolphin may work — an apartment
living room, a six-people office with A/C working, and a noisy coffee shop. First, we
measured the noise floors of the Macbook and the iPhone, respectively, in an isolated silent
environment. Next, we measured the ambient noise power spectrum at different places.
These results are shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Spectrum of Ambient Noise
Most digital electronics today can support an acoustic sampling rate of up to 44.1kHz,
indicating that the largest operating frequency is 22.05kHz, i.e., the Nyquist frequency. As
seen from the figure, the ambient noise at the office and the coffee shop are notably high
— around 40 dB above noise floor for both Macbook and iPhone at low frequencies. The
noise power in the living room reduces to a small value above 5kHz, while the office and
the coffee shop still have a plenty of noise power until 10kHz and 15kHz, respectively.
Human voice is usually below 5kHz. Noise around 10kHz is due to the A/C noise in the
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office and the music in the coffee shop. A key observation is that the noise powers at all
three locations decrease quickly to a small value above 15kHz.
Dolphin uses four speaker-microphone acoustic channels — Mac to Mac, iPhone
to Mac, Mac to iPhone, and iPhone to iPhone. A device’s microphone receives acoustic
signals from the other device’s and its own speakers. Figure 4.4 depicts the frequency
response for the four channels. The frequency responses were measured by sending a
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Figure 4.4: Frequency Responses for “Speaker to Microphone” Pairs
series of tones from a speaker and recording the received signal power at a microphone.
The tones were of frequencies between 1kHz and 22kHz at intervals of 100Hz and at the
same power level. Each plot of Figure 4.4 uses the maximum power of any received tone
as the reference. We point out that during the course of the measurement, the iPhone
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and the Macbook were placed in the way as described in Section 4.4.6. From Figure 4.4,
we observe that a remarkable power attenuation occurs at around 18kHz for Macbook
microphone and 20kHz for iPhone microphone. More information will be lost if signals
are transmitted at frequencies beyond the attenuation point.
We also notice that human hearing sensitivity dramatically drops at frequencies
higher than 10kHz. This is reflected by the absolute threshold of hearing (ATH) graph,
Figure 4.5 (taken from [109]), where the two dotted lines represent age 40 group and age
60 group, respectively. The ATH graph depicts a curve such that given a frequency, we
can hear a tone only if its sound pressure level (SPL)1 is above the curve. The ATH graph
implies that an acoustic system should use high frequency signals to be less annoying.
Figure 4.5: ATH Graph
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Figure 4.6: Filter Response
Given these observations, we decide to use 16kHz acoustic channel in Dolphin. Fix-
ing the channel frequency, Dolphin uses a high-pass Finite Impulse Response (FIR) filter,
depicted in Figure 4.6, to reduce noise power. Figure 4.3 shows that ambient noise is as
high as 45 dB over the noise floor. The filter suppresses the frequencies below 15kHz by
1Sound pressure is the pressure caused by a sound wave, describing the sound loudness [84]. SPL is its
logarithmic measure (in decibels) relative to a reference pressure, 20µPa.
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an average of 55dB while preserving the frequencies above 15.5kHz.
Despite noise interference, a symbol of a signal is also interfered by its predeces-
sor and successor, i.e., Inter-Symbol-Interference (ISI). We transmitted a 256-sample sine
wave tone (at 16kHz) in each of the four channels and plotted the received signals in Fig-
ure 4.7. We observe a notable rise phase in the two channels where Macbook is the sender.
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Figure 4.7: Rise and Reverberation Time in the Four Channels
In audio programming, a speaker sounds according to what a program sets in the audio
buffer. Ideally, the diaphragm of a speaker immediately switches to the desired amplitude
in the buffer. However, speakers are analog devices and need time to “warm up”, which is
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reflected as a rise time. An undistinguished speaker makes more notable rise time than a
nice one does. In the meantime, we observe a reverberation time in all four channels, with
the Mac-to-Mac channel having the longest one. We transmitted tones of different lengths
to see the change of the reverberation time. The results are listed in Table 4.1. The ISI
Table 4.1: Sine Wave and Reverberation Time
Sine Wave 64 128 256 512
Reverberation 122 210 348 617
is caused by the rise and reverberation interferences. To avoid the interferences, Dolphin
selects 700 as the symbol length and the first 256 samples are reserved for the sine wave
tone.
4.4.2 Modulation
In Dolphin, modulation is to transform a binary bit to a high-frequency sine wave tone that
can be transmitted over the acoustic channel. There are many modulation approaches, in-
cluding amplitude-shift keying (ASK), phase-shift keying (PSK), and frequency-shift key-
ing (FSK). Dolphin uses a simple on-off keying (OOK), in which the presence or absence
of a tone denotes bit 1 or 0. OOK is vulnerable to noise interference. Figure 4.8 shows the
theoretical bit error rate (BER) versus signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for four modulations:
OOK, quadratic PSK (QPSK), binary PSK (BPSK), and binary FSK (BFSK) [12]. The
channel is an additive white Gaussian noise channel. With the decrease of the SNR (to the
left of the figure), OOK quickly gets to a high bit error rate. Particularly, the BER of OOK
gets to 0.32 when SNR is 5dB. This vulnerability harms a communication system but helps
Dolphin to restrict distance. Increasing acoustic signal’s travel distance decreases the SNR
and dramatically hampers the demodulation. In the meantime, OOK is easy to demodulate
and is also used by NFC standard [85].
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Dolphin transforms a binary sequence to a series of symbols. A symbol carries a bit
“1” if it has a 16kHz sine wave tone in the first 256 samples and a bit “0” otherwise.
4.4.3 Calibration and Safe Distance
Dolphin restricts distance by manipulating the signal amplitude and thus changing the emit-
ted SPL. We need to know how much amplitude can produce a given SPL. We let Macbook
and iPhone play a 16kHz sine wave signal at various amplitudes under full volume and
measured the SPLs at a reference distance d0. We set d0 = 1cm in our implementation.
The results are shown in Figure 4.9 where the markers are the measured data points. We
can see that the logarithm of the amplitudes are linear in the SPLs, which conforms to the
definition of SPL [84]:
Lp = 20 · log10(
Prms
Pre f
) = 20 · log10(
A/
√
2
Pre f
).
Here, Lp is the SPL at point p. Pre f is 20 µPa in air. Prms is the root-mean-square of the
signal’s amplitudes and equals to A/
√
2 because the signal is a sine wave.
The inverse distance law [84] states that sound pressure falls inversely proportional
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to the distance away from a sound source. The sound pressure levels Lp1 and Lp2 at distance
d1 and d2 conform to the following equation.
Lp2−Lp1 =−10 · log10(
d2
d1
)2 =−20 · log10
d2
d1
. (4.1)
Dolphin achieves distance restriction by preventing an honest party’s signals being demod-
ulated beyond a safe distance d. Let La be the SPL of ambient noise. For OOK modulation,
SNR = Ld−La ≤ 5dB is sufficiently low to cause a high bit error rate. According to (4.1),
we can calculate the needed SPL L0 at the reference distance
L0 ≤ La+20 · log10
d
d0
+5.
In our implementation, we choose Ld−La = 0 and d = 15cm, which yields L0 = La+23.52.
Using Figure 4.9 and interpolation, we can calculate the needed amplitude for L0.
4.4.4 Synchronization
For confidentiality purpose, Dolphin requires the two devices to transmit signals simulta-
neously to interfere the two signals. For example, Figure 4.10a shows a received signal,
when iPhone sends “101” and Macbook sends “111”. Although the first time slot and the
third time slot both have symbol interference, they have different combined signal shapes.
Without knowledge of any original message, it is very difficult to separate and recover the
two signals.
Synchronizing two devices’ actions is challenging, because network status and a
device’s internal status are time-varying. We attempted to use an Internet time server,
time.apple.com, but the accuracy turned out to be not acceptable. There were nearly
0.05-second difference, resulting in a start mismatch of 2205 samples. To achieve syn-
chronization, Dolphin estimates the message delivery time and balances start time on the
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Figure 4.10: Signal Interferences and Synchronization
two devices. We remark that considering its easy adoption, we are not giving up the time
server based approach but looking for more precise solutions, e.g., GPS Time server or the
approach in [97]. We leave the improvement to our future work.
A start mismatch is the time difference, measured in number of samples, between
the start points of two signals. The start mismatch of two signals need to be less than one
tone length, i.e., 256 samples in Dolphin, to fully interfere them. Furthermore, we say that
two signals are entangled if their start mismatch is less than half a tone length.
Start mismatch is caused by system latency and audio buffer size. System latency
includes network latency and internal latency caused by a device’s internal procedures, e.g.,
job scheduling. Dolphin measures and estimates system latency as follows. First, Dolphin
enhances its own instance’s priority to the highest possible level, to reduce internal latency.
In iOS and Mac OSX, this is achieved by using p thread library and NSThread API.
The smartphone sends a probe message to the terminal, which sends an acknowledgement
message immediately after the probe arrives. Upon receiving the acknowledgement, the
smartphone calculates the message round trip time rtt. Repeating the process a few times,
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the smartphone obtains an estimated message delivery time rtt/2, where rtt is the average
round trip time. The estimation is performed each time before signal transmission. Once
the smartphone sends a “start transmission” message, it holds for rtt/2 to start transmission
and the terminal starts transmission upon receiving the message.
In audio programming, the speaker does not sound until the entire audio buffer is
fulfilled. Hence, audio buffer size also affects the latency. To test the impact, we used
system default buffer size for iPhone and measured start mismatches by changing Mac-
book’s buffer sizes to 10, 200, 400, 600, 800, and 1000 samples. A measurement is done
by transmitting two messages, “1000” and “0001” and counting samples between the starts
of the two tones. The start mismatch is the absolute difference between the counting result
and the expect number, 2100 (3× symbol length). For each buffer size, we used 4 different
WiFi networks and performed 50 measurements in each network. The networks’ average
ping times are 7.639ms, 3.777ms, 4.770ms, and 25.546ms. The standard deviations are
3.171, 1.275, 5.451, and 10.332. Figure 4.10b shows the start mismatches in box plots. In
a box plot, the box encloses the points from the 25 percentile to the 75 percentile, and the
red line in the box represents the median. The red dashed line in the figure denotes the
entanglement boundary. A point below the line, colored dark green, indicates that the two
measured signals are entangled. The remaining points are colored light grey. Obviously, a
600-sample long buffer performs best since most of its points are below the entanglement
boundary. Specifically, it has 149 mismatches less than 128, and 187 ones less than 256.
Increasing the buffer size, we can see that the 6 medians show a “V” shape in Figure 4.10b.
This is because a small buffer size makes Macbook respond faster than iPhone while a large
one makes Macbook respond slower. By setting buffer size to 600, Dolphin can synchronize
most transmissions and thus protect confidentiality of the final assertions. If a synchro-
nization fails, Dolphin just re-executes the protocol until a synchronized transmission is
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achieved. Synchronization failure causes decoding failure, which is detected by CRC code
in Dolphin, see Section 4.4.6.
4.4.5 Self-Interference Cancellation
The biggest challenge for full-duplex communication is to cancel self signal interference
and extract the other party’s message, which is called self-interference cancellation (SIC)
[50]. Radio wireless communication researchers achieved SIC by accurately placing an
additional antenna [50], recording the oppositely phased version of self signal, and using
it to cancel self signal on flight. This design is for distant transmission where the arriving
signal is much weaker than the self signal. However, Dolphin works in the near field and
both signals are equally strong. In addition, an additional antenna is not available on most
devices.
Dolphin’s SIC approach is to subtract a device’s self signal from its received one so
as to obtain the arriving signal. Different from the aforementioned SIC, our approach is an
off-line process and has a smaller throughput. Note that maximizing throughput is not the
aim of Dolphin. The goal of our SIC approach is to reconstruct the self signal, which has
been distorted by the arriving signal.
Dolphin reconstructs the self signal using a pre-learned reference symbol. Before
signal transmission, each device sends itself a symbol carrying bit 1. This phase is called
beep, and the symbol is called reference symbol. Next, the device arranges the reference
symbol according to its own message’s binary sequence: putting the symbol at where bit 1
appears to cancel the self signal.
Directly using the reference symbol cannot obtain a good SIC result because we
have not considered distortions caused by transmission. Sampling distortion is caused by
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Figure 4.11: Sampling Distortion
the offset between two digital-to-analog procedures — recording reference symbols and
recording message. This is illustrated in Figure 4.11, where Fs is the sampling frequency.
The offset ∆t is always smaller than 1/Fs. Fixing ∆t, we can use discrete Fourier
transform (DFT) to shift a sample sequence (blue lines) by ∆t. Fourier transform states that
a signal x(n) can be represented by the summation of a series of sinusoids
x[n] =
N/2
∑
k=0
(ReX [k]cos(2pikn/N)+ ImX [k]sin(2pikn/N)),
where N is the number of samples, X [k] is the k-th frequency domain sample, and ReX [k],
ImX [k] are its real and image parts. The signal can be losslessly reconstructed if its fre-
quency is less than Fs/2. Therefore, we use equation
x′[n] =
N/2
∑
k=0
(ReX [k]cos(2pikn/N+2pik∆tFs/N)
+ImX [k]sin(2pikn/N+2pik∆tFs/N))
to obtain the shifted sample sequence x′[1..N]. Technically, the shift operations are done in
the frequency domain. Dolphin first transforms a time domain sequence to the frequency
domain, then applies a fractional offset filter [80] to the sequence, and finally transforms
them back to the time domain.
To perform SIC, we need to locate the start point of a tone in the received signal.
The location process introduces Symbol synchronization distortion. Dolphin locates a tone
by seeking a sharp power jump in the signal. Therefore, the located point may be a few
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samples away from the true start point. This error makes the reference symbol not line up
with a symbol in the received message signal.
Given a reference symbol re f , a self message m, and a received, interfered sample
sequence s, Dolphin performs SIC in the following way. SIC has three parameters w0, wreg,
and β . w0 and wreg denote the position search range for the first tone and the rest tones,
respectively. β is the offset increment. Our implementation used w0 = 128, wreg = 40,
and β = 20. We note that the first message bit m[0] is always set to 1 for synchronization
purpose.
1. Dolphin locates the the start point p of the first tone in s and initializes a message
pointer pm← 0.
2. If m[pm] = 0, go to 6.
3. If pm = 0, set r← w0; otherwise, set r← wreg.
4. For all p′ ∈ [p− r .. p+ r] and all ∆t = αβ ·Fs , where α ∈ [0..β ], Dolphin computes
pmin and ∆tmin such that
(pmin,∆tmin) = argmin
p′,∆t
L
∑
k=1
(s[p′+ k]− re f ∆t [k])2,
where L is the symbol length and re f ∆t denotes shifting reference symbol by ∆t.
5. Perform SIC: s[pmin+ k] = s[pmin+ k]− re f ∆tmin [k], for 1≤ k ≤ L.
6. If pm is less than the message length, p← p+L, pm← pm+1 and go to 2. Otherwise,
SIC terminates.
We remark that, in 4, Dolphin searches 2r neighbors around point p to find a best matched
position. We search a larger range w0 at the first tone position than the rest to cancel the
impact of the start mismatch.
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4.4.6 Putting The Pieces Together
Dolphin places the two device speakers as close as possible. From a distant attacker’s point
of view, the two acoustic signals seem to come from the same point and are difficult to
separate. The inseparability protects the confidentiality of the resulting assertions. Fig-
ure 4.12 shows microphone and speaker positions on iPhone (left) and Macbook (middle).
The rightmost picture shows the placement of the two devices in Dolphin. iPhone and
Macbook touch each other at the speakers. iPhone microphone is 1cm away from the touch
point while Macbook microphone is 6cm away.
speakermic
iPhone
Macbook
Figure 4.12: Placing Two Device Speakers Closely. Rightmost Is How We Place a Smart-
phone in Dolphin
First, Dolphin selects a safe distance d. When a smartphone and a terminal are
properly placed, Dolphin works as follows. We note that when we say “sending message”
we mean sending over the local network.
• The terminal sends a start request to the smartphone. Upon receiving the request, the
smartphone measures and estimates the message delivery time rtt/2 (Section 4.4.4).
• The smartphone sends a “start measurement” message to the terminal. The terminal
starts to measure ambient SPL when the message arrives, while the smartphone holds
for rtt/2 seconds to start measurement. Both devices determine the needed signal
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amplitude as discussed in Section 4.4.3. In the meantime, the devices respectively
choose a 16-bit random number with the first bit fixed to 1. Appending a 4-bit CRC
code, each device obtains a 20-bit message to be sent out. Using OOK modulation
(Section 4.4.2), each device converts the binary sequence to a 16kHz signal.
• After the above preparation, the smartphone sends a “start transmission” message to
the terminal. The terminal emits its signal as soon as it receives the message. The
smartphone holds for rtt/2 to transmit its signal.
• Each device performs SIC over the received signal, i.e., a sequence of samples (Sec-
tion 4.4.5). The resulting sample sequence is fed to the OOK demodulator to obtain
the message from the other party. CRC check is performed over the message. If the
check fails, the device reports the failure and requests for another round of protocol.
Otherwise, the first 16-bit binary sequence is extracted. Both devices append smart-
phone’s binary sequence to the terminal’s. The 32-bit number is the final near field
assertion.
• For the “Assertion Only” scenario, each device signs the assertion, encrypts the sig-
nature using the other party’s public key, and sends it to the other party for validation.
For the “Authentication” scenario, the two devices execute a password based authen-
ticated key exchange protocol (PAKE) [15, 24] to derive a shared session key. The
32-bit number serves as the shared password in PAKE.
4.4.7 Security Discussion
Distance restriction is guaranteed by the physical properties of sound. The inverse distance
law of acoustics and BER-SNR relation of OOK modulation theoretically guarantee that
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beyond the safe distance the emitted acoustic signal’s power drops to such a low value that
it is impossible to correctly demodulate the message.
Confidentiality is achieved by the interference of the two signals. An attacker can-
not separate or recover the two signals if he is oblivious to both. Ideally, two symbols
interfere in three cases “1-1”, “1-0”, and “0-0”. The “0-0” case is easy to detect. For the
“1-0” case, an attacker has to determine which party emits bit 1. Addressing this problem
requires the knowledge of at least one message. For the “1-1” case, it is difficult for an
attacker to determine whether it is a single 1-bit contaminated by noise or the combination
of two 1-bits. The real cases are more complicated. For example, determining whether it is
a “1-1” case is not easy because signals may cancel each other (see Appendix 4.7).
In Section 4.4.5, we mentioned that during SIC, range w0 is set to be sufficiently
large to tolerate start mismatch. Particularly, choice of w0 depends on the security level
of the implementation. A larger w0 tolerates a larger mismatch but makes the two signals
more vulnerable to separation and puts the confidentiality of the assertions at higher risk. If
an implementation does not require confidentiality, it can use a large w0 to make the system
more robust. More attacks are discussed below.
Relay Attacks. An honest party only accepts an arriving signal that starts the first
tone at most w0 samples later than itself does, leaving an extremely small time window
for relaying messages. Our implementation uses a time window of 128/44.1 = 2.9ms.
The time window can be squeezed or relaxed by changing w0. This means that our relay
resistance is adjustable and thus flexible to be adopted by different applications.
Source Separation Attacks. An attacker may try to separate the two signals by
using blind audio source separation (BASS) that has been studied in acoustics [102]. How-
ever, BASS algorithms separate audio sources based on the the sound’s acoustic pattern,
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such as frequency, sound pressure level, etc. An example is to separate human speech from
background music. However, given a combined message signal in Dolphin, it is difficult to
distinguish between a symbol sent by the smartphone and a symbol sent by the terminal.
This makes BASS impossible to separate the two signals. We will verify this property in
Section 4.5.2.
Multi-reception Attacks. Attackers place multiple microphones near the two com-
municating devices trying to separate the two signals as in a multi-input multi-output
(MIMO) system. However, MIMO needs senders and receivers collaborate to frequently
measure the channel information between them because the channels are time-varying. Our
threat models assume that an attacker does not control any device and thus cannot carry out
such attacks.
Delaying Attacks. Since an attacker controls the local network connections, he can
delay the smartphone’s probe messages to increase its measured message delivery time but
delivers the “start transmission” message as normal. In this way, the smartphone’s signal
transmission is delayed and the two signals are easy to separate. However, any delay larger
than the time window bounded by w0 causes demodulation failure and voids the resulting
assertions.
Placement Attacks. Attackers try to find a vantage position where the arriving time
gap between the two signals is stretched to a sufficiently large value to separate them. By
triangle inequality, we know that the arriving time gap is no more than de/vs, where de is
the distance between the two speakers and vs is the speed of sound, i.e., 340m/s. Dolphin
requires the two speakers to stay close and de is smaller than 0.1m, resulting in a mismatch
of 13 (0.1×44100/340) samples.
Shouting Attacks. During the course of measuring ambient SPL, an attacker cre-
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ates a loud sound to make the devices transmit acoustic signals with a higher power than
needed. In this way, the attacker attempts to force two distant devices to generate a valid
assertion. First, we note that a device speaker cannot sound arbitrarily large and such an
attack fails when the two devices are far away from each other. In out implementation,
Macbook and iPhone both sound less than 100dBSPL at 1cm which means that the SNR
drops to 0 beyond 3.16 meters (10
50
20 cm) in a 50dBSPL environment. In addition, to achieve
a wanted distance d′, an attacker has to lift the ambient noise SPL by 20log10 d
′
d . For ex-
ample, d = 15cm in Dolphin, an attacker has to increase the noise by 16dBSPL so as to
attack two devices that are 1 meter apart. This 16dBSPL increment is so loud (> 2× loud
[99]) to arouse a device owner’s suspicion. Since Dolphin is designed as an automated and
long-running service, it can measure the ambient SPL at random time points and reject any
suspiciously sharp increment.
Distance Fraud. In this attack, one of the two communicating devices is malicious
and tries to get valid assertions when it is beyond the safe distance. We remark that this
attack is not the main attack Dolphin aims to defend against because our threat model
assumes that both devices are honest. We argue that such attacks are difficult to succeed.
First, an attacker has to find some way to increase the SNR that drops to a useless level
beyond the safe distance. He can either use a directional microphone to increase the arriving
signal power or execute an active noise control system to reduce the noise power. However,
using a directional microphone in close proximity is very suspicious and an active noise
control system is not practical in an enclosed space as large as a room [92].
4.5 Performance Evaluation
We have designed a series of tests to evaluate the performance of Dolphin, including suc-
cess rate under various conditions, security performance, execution time, and energy usage
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(a) Location testing (b) Usage environment testing
(c) Stress testing
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Figure 4.13: Success Rate Testings
on smartphones.
4.5.1 Success Rate
Before presenting the results, we remark that Dolphin uses 4-bit CRC code to detect bit
errors and repeats the protocol if an error occurs. Hence, in practice, Dolphin guarantees to
successfully achieve a valid assertion. Comparing with contextual co-presence approaches,
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Dolphin enables a communicating party to locally check the validity of an assertion via
CRC check. We suppressed the redo part of Dolphin in the evaluation of success rate.
In the following experiments, each device performs one signal transmission per execution
of Dolphin. We say the communication is successful if the two resulting assertions are
identical.
First, we tested our system at three locations, a living room, an office with A/C
working, and a coffee shop during busy hours. Table 4.2 lists the average ambient noise
SPL and statistics of network ping time at the three locations.
Table 4.2: Statistics of Locations
Office Coffee Shop Room
Noise avg (dBSPL) 59.4 67.3 42.8
RTT avg (ms) 3.801 9.468 6.055
RTT stddev (ms) 1.922 10.666 2.407
At each location, we let iPhone and Macbook conduct the protocol and do 150
signal transmissions. After each transmission, we record whether the CRC check succeeds
on both devices and whether the communication succeeds. The success rates are shown in
Figure 4.13a. The communication success rate is the highest in the living room (82.9%)
and the lowest in the noisy coffee shop (70%). The success rate in the office is also high,
although the ambient noise SPL is not low. The reason is that the noise in the office is
mostly caused by A/C (which is stable), while the coffee shop often has a noise burst, e.g.,
running an espresso machine or blending coffee beans. We also notice that the iPhone has
a very high CRC success rate, because its microphone is very close to the two speakers and
captures the signal much more clearly than the Macbook does. Inspired by this observation,
we ran Dolphin on two iPhones, an iPhone 5 and an iPhone 5s. We put the two iPhones face
up, bottom to bottom, and 1cm apart. Finally, we obtained a high communication success
rate — 96.3%, 98.2%, and 95.7% at the office, living room, and coffee shop, respectively.
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Next, we tested our implementation under a high latency WiFi environment and
three human usage environments: web browsing, heavy typing on the build-in keyboard,
and heavy typing on an external USB keyboard. Each testing performed 150 signal trans-
missions. During the testings, we kept a non-stop web browsing or keyboard typing while
the system was running. To make a loud noise, we use an old fashioned mechanical key-
board when using an external keyboard in testing. The resulting success rates are shown
in Figure 4.13b. Bad WiFi connection suppresses the communication success rate to 21%.
The network RTT has a mean of 939.67ms and a standard deviation of 243.488. The low
success rate is caused by the high latency variance which makes Dolphin’s latency esti-
mation inaccurate. In bad network testing, iPhone has a high CRC success rate because
the mismatch is so large that the iPhone only heard its own signal. Typing on the build-in
keyboard results in a lower success rate than typing on the external one, because the keys
around CAPS key on the build-in keyboard are close to the speakers and typing on these
keys affects the signals very much. Web browsing does not affect the success rate since it
uses less touch to the CAPS key area.
The first search range w0 determines Dolphin’s tolerance to the signal mismatch
and affects the success rate. We executed Dolphin using different w0, which was set to 16,
32, 64, 128, and 256 respectively. The resulting success rates are depicted by Figure 4.13d.
We observe that the growth of w0 dramatically increases the success rate.
Dolphin synchronizes two signals by estimating system latency. Multiple tasks
contending resources may make the estimation inaccurate and fail the communication. We
tested the success rate of Dolphin while letting one or two CPU-intensive processes occupy
CPU resources. We ran an infinite AES encryption process to occupy one of the two cores
in the CPU and Geekbench 3 to occupy both. The testing is performed on Macbook side
because 1) working on computer and putting smartphone aside is a common scenario in
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smartphone assisted system; 2) the testing is already sufficient to show the success rate
change. The resulting success rates are shown in Figure 4.13c. The success rate is reduced
to 62% when one core is occupied and 50% when both are occupied. Mac OSX scheduler
tries to assign equal resources to long-running jobs [91]. Contention between jobs makes
the latency estimation not accurate and thus fails the synchronization and the corresponding
SIC phase.
4.5.2 Security Performance
Dolphin utilizes fast decaying acoustic signal to restrict the distance between two devices.
We placed iPhone (resp. Macbook) speaker at different distances to Macbook(resp. iPhone)
microphone and let the speaker transmit signals. The received SNRs are shown in Fig-
ure 4.14a. We can see that doubling distance reduces SNR by nearly 6dB, which verifies
the inverse distance law, see Equation (4.1). This makes obtaining valid assertions beyond
the safe distance impossible.
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Figure 4.14: (a): SNR vs. Distance (b): Distance of two tones
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One may worry about whether the two signals can be separated by their individ-
ual patterns by using, for example, machine learning approaches. We argue that the two
sine wave tones produced by Macbook and iPhone are almost identical by showing the
normalized Euclidean distance between them. The Macbook emits a tone first and the
iPhone sounds later. We use a third iPhone to record the two tones, obtaining two sample
sequences. The distance is calculated as follows: 1) use cross correlation to find a start
point in each sequence such that beginning from the point, the two sequences are optimally
matched; 2)obtain two sequences, x and y, truncated from the start points; 3) normalize x,y
using min-max normalization and calculate the normalized Euclidean distance between
them. We calculated the distance for 100 pairs of tones, and plotted the results in Fig-
ure 4.14b. As can be seen from the figure, most distances are less than 0.015, indicating
that the two tones in most cases are almost identical.
As discussed previously, an attacker cannot separate two signals by placing a de-
vice at a vantage position with respect to the touch point of Macbook and iPhone. This
ensures the confidentiality feature of Dolphin. We placed a smartphone (“attacker”) to col-
lect two signals at various positions around the touch point. Particularly, the smartphone
is placed at 10cm to the touch point but at different angles. In our device placement (Fig-
ure 4.12), let the positive direction be the direction from the touch point to the rightmost.
If we draw a circle centred at the touch point, a line connecting the centre and a point on
the circle forms an angle with the positive direction. An angle is positive if the positive
direction turns clockwise to the line. We placed the smartphone at the position of angles
of 0◦, 45◦, 90◦, 135◦,180◦, and − 135◦. For each position, the two devices transmitted
100 pairs of signals. The attacker captured a pair and calculated the start mismatch as in
Section 4.4.4. Figure 4.15a shows the results in boxplots and the x-axis lists the position
angles. We can see that for all testing positions most of the signal pairs are entangled, i.e.,
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Figure 4.15: Mismatch of Two Signals Obtained by an Attacker on Various Positions
start mismatch (green points) is smaller than 128. An attacker’s advantage is the difference
between the start mismatch obtained by the attacker and the one obtained by an honest
party. In Figure 4.15b, we show the attacker’s advantages for all testing pairs. We observe
that most (>80%) of the attacker’s advantages are below 15, which conforms to our previ-
ous analysis, and all of them are smaller than 25. Therefore, it is of small probability that
an attacker obtains two separated signals while the two honest parties do not notice it. From
the figure, we also notice that an attacker maximizes his advantage by placing devices on
positions of 0◦ and 180◦, whose median (red line) is obviously higher than the rest. This
also verifies our analysis and suggests that these two positions should be especially cleared
during the system execution.
4.5.3 Energy Usage
Dolphin is designed to be running on smartphones, where energy saving is vital. By using
iPhone’s logging for developers, we tracked the energy consumptions of Dolphin as well
as Safari and Youtube for comparison purpose. The test device is an iPhone 5s running
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iOS 7. The log file is transferred to and visualized in XCode Instrument Tool which uses
unit Energy Usage Level on a scale of 0-20 to indicate the current energy usage. The
track lasted for 30 minutes and energy usage is logged per second. Figure 4.16a shows a
snapshot of the logged results. It is clear that watching online video consumed the least
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Figure 4.16: (a)Dolphin’s Energy Usage Level; (b)Signal Processing Time on iPhone and
MacBook
energy and Dolphin consumed nearly the same energy as Safari did. Specifically, the ratio
of Dolphin’s total energy consumption to Safari’s is 1.03. Such an energy consumption
achieves our goal of sustainability, since web browsing is not a battery killer task and can
last for nearly 10 hours [101].
The execution time of Dolphin consists of two main parts — signal transmission
and the following signal processing, including FFT, SIC, etc. The signal transmission
costs 700× 20/44100 = 0.317 seconds. To get signal processing time, we ran Dolphin
for 100 times and calculated the average time for signal processing. The result is shown
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in Figure 4.16b. The time values of iPhone squeeze around the mean of 5.83 seconds
while the time values of Macbook have a large standard deviation but a smaller mean, 2.68
seconds.
4.6 Conclusions
We have designed and implemented Dolphin — an acoustic near field assertion system.
Dolphin utilizes the fast decay property of acoustic signals to restrict distance, and full-
duplex communication to defend against relay attacks. It has an adjustable safe distance
(for restricting distance) and an adjustable time window (for defending against relay at-
tacks), generates confidential assertions, needs zero user interactions, and is battery friendly.
Extensive experiments are carried out to evaluate the performance of Dolphin.
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4.7 Illustrating SIC and Demodulation Process by An Example
We use an example to illustrate the SIC and demodulation process of Dolphin. All the plots
here use sample index as x-axis and signal amplitude as y-axis.
Macbook and iPhone simultaneously send binary sequences 11100010110111001101
and 10100101100001111100, respectively. Figure 4.17a shows the signal that was cap-
tured by the iPhone and filtered by the HPF (Section 4.4.1).
(a) Signal at iPhone: after HPF, before SIC
(b) Signal at iPhone: after SIC, before Squaring
An interesting observation is that the two symbols in some “1-1” symbol pairs can-
cel each other, highlighted by red boxes. The rest of the “1-1” pairs have the two symbols
add to each other. This observation shows that detecting the “1-1” case in a real signal trans-
mission is difficult for attackers. The signal obtained after applying SIC is shown in 4.17b.
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(c) Signal at iPhone: after Squaring and LPF, before digitalization
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
(d) Signal at iPhone: decoded message
Figure 4.17: Digital Signal Processing on iPhone
SIC has filled part of the cancellation in the two special “1-1” symbol pairs, which makes
the correct decoding possible for the communicating party. Next, the signal is squared and
filtered by a low pass filter (LPF), shown in Figure 4.16c. Finally, we digitalize the signal
by comparing each sample value against the mean value of the first symbol (Figure 4.16d).
We observe that the iPhone successfully extracted the sequence 11100010110111001101
transmitted by the Macbook.
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